Palestinians learning lessons

by Tareq Baconi

Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (left) and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas

What has been happening to Hamas over the past few months, and what to Mahmoud Abbas? And what is the impact of all this on the reconciliation effort?

There has been much speculation over Hamas’ recent maneuverings and their impact on the latest reconciliation effort between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas’ leadership appears to be divided: Khaled Meshaal is making overtures that seem to be out of line with the movement’s perceived ideology. Or are they? What has been happening to Hamas over the past few months and what is the impact of that on the reconciliation effort?

Looking at the movement’s behaviour over the past decade or so, I would argue that Hamas’ desire to be integrated into the Palestinian political system has not subsided but has grown stronger. I would also argue that its actions do not suggest a recent softening in ideology or greater ‘moderation’. Rather, they are signs of an increased political adeptness which are enabling it to better communicate ‘more moderate’ goals that have been consistent for at least the past five years, arguably longer.

For the current reconciliation effort to succeed, it is important that the two parties do not proceed under the assumption that Hamas has only recently shown signs of moderation and is therefore likely to have different national objectives. No. Hamas has the same objectives for a unity government that it had back in 2006 when the last unity government was attempted. The difference now is that Mahmoud Abbas might be more open to these objectives and Hamas might be more competent at communicating them.

Essential lessons

The last significant reconciliation effort between Hamas and Fatah occurred following Yasser Arafat’s death in late 2004. By then, calls for Palestinian Authority (PA) reform were omnipresent and the Palestinian government was a mess, both physically and with respect to its authority and governance. Abbas reached out to the Palestinian factions proposing to shake up the political structure to make it more inclusive. He called on the factions to produce initiatives for a unified leadership and encouraged their participation in the government. He realized that to reform the Palestinian institutions and security forces for an effective fresh start in 2005, he needed the full support of the Palestinian people represented by the various factions.

Presidential elections took place 60 days following Arafat’s death followed by PLC elections in 2006 - the first in a decade. Those led to Hamas’ much publicized victory in a government of national unity which was democratically elected, more representative of the Palestinian people and bent on reform. For Palestinians, it was a promising start to democracy and reform in the territories apart for one fact; the international community led by the US opposed a Hamas-led government. Consequently, the newly-elected government failed as quickly as it formed and much more bloodily.

It did nonetheless leave behind essential lessons which are relevant to the current reconciliation efforts. At the time, there was an inherent incompatibility in the reform visions of the key players. Abbas’ ‘reform’ entailed reducing Fatah’s strong hold on the PA and the PLO institutions. He sought ‘buy in’ from other factions by steering the government towards greater inclusivity. He pursued greater coordination on the security and governance front and fostered more dialogue. Yet for all his reform efforts, Abbas was not ready, willing or able to concede that more inclusion could mean a shift in the Palestinian national strategy that Fatah had unilaterally forged over the years, a strategy based on negotiations.

Instead, he viewed increased inclusion as a means for the PA’s decisions to become more binding on ‘opposition factions’. Hamas’ presence in government, for example, would allow it to object to the PA’s participation in peace talks, but Hamas would most likely be outnumbered and would consequently have to acquiesce. After all, not every party in the government has to endorse every decision. Only the government has to endorse it for the parties to be bound by it.

In contrast, Hamas’ vision for reform was much more comprehensive. It envisioned a complete over-haul of the foundations and pillars of the Palestinian political establishment as it stood at the time. Whereas the PA was born out of Oslo, Hamas believed that the Second Intifada had clearly demonstrated the failure of negotiations, and therefore argued that the political system should not be based on such a default strategy. Rather, Hamas wished to establish a non-corrupt Palestinian government which represented the entirety of the Palestinian people, one which asserted its right to resistance and which was not bound by concessions which gave away basic ‘Palestinian constants’ such as the right of return. Such a government would set its national policy based on the democratic will of the Palestinian people, Hamas insisted, whether through negotiations or resistance.

This fundamental incompatibility meant that when both parties were indeed integrated into a single government, it was bound to fail. Clearly external pressure left no room for success, but internal challenges also existed. The government quickly disintegrated into a West Bank government and a Gaza government.

A narrowing gap

The historic incompatibility persists to this day, albeit to a lesser extent as the gap has narrowed since 2005. Both parties have acquired significant experience in their mutually exclusive governance which may shape the way they approach the current reconciliation effort.

Relative to 2005-2007, Abbas is a lot less susceptible to US and Israeli pressure, as is evident from his open defiance of both at the UN. Theoretically, his loss of faith in the peace process could make him more open to at least discussing alternatives to the Palestinian approach to the conflict, as compared to the past when his vision was limited by the urgent need to end the miserable cycle of violence.

Hamas has also changed over the past few years, but not in its vision of a unity Palestinian government open to resistance, despite the recent media fever over a sudden turn towards ‘moderation’. It has changed in its mode of engagement with the international community and other Palestinian factions.

Media preoccupation with Hamas’ ‘moderation’ focused on ‘the Doha agreement’ [1], where Hamas accepted Abbas’ appointment as Prime Minister of the interim Palestinian government. However, the fact that the government is an interim government is precisely what has escaped media attention. Hamas has not accepted a Palestinian leadership under Abbas. It has rather agreed that Abbas take the necessary pre-requisite steps leading to elections which would choose that leadership at the end of the year.

The interim government composed of a number of committees is tasked with the gargantuan challenge of creating a single governmental infrastructure and framework to house the soon-to-be elected government. It is also of course tasked with the challenge of reforming the election committee and preparing for the actual elections, suitably postponed now from the middle to the end of the year.

More proof that Hamas is moderating its stance is held up in the fact that it joined the PLO. Yet that is not a recent initiative either. Hamas has consistently stated that it wished to be a part of the PLO but had refused the PLO’s recognition of Israel. So what has changed? What has changed is that Hamas has joined the PLO, getting the process of reconciliation rolling again, but has not yet recognized Israel. World audiences may hope that by being part of the PLO Hamas has implicitly recognized Israel, but that is the same as saying that by accepting a Palestinian state with1967 borders, which it has, it has also implicitly recognized Israel. This latest move is therefore no more of a break with the core ideology than the offer of a long term hudna upon Israel’s withdrawal. No Hamas spokesperson will outwardly recognize Israel, which is a clear indication that Hamas has not actually made any ideological concessions by joining the PLO.

Joining in the ‘spring’?

Then comes the renunciation of violence. Seen alongside Meshaal’s declaration of intent in forming a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, it seems that the movement is splitting. Meshaal appears to be leading the movement through the regional upheaval by carving a place for it amongst the peaceful political Islamic parties coming to power in the region. His actions imply a return to a grass root organization focused on dawa and social work, one which could be active in politics and governance and which could forge ties with the international community. The Egyptian and Tunisian Islamic parties are clearly setting an example.

This vision is certainly more moderate than say Zahhar’s or Haniyeh’s in Gaza who appear to be wedded to Hamas’ commitment to resistance until the occupation has been forced to withdraw to 1967 borders. Yet the division between the two has not been formalized and it is unlikely to be. It is entirely feasible that Hamas’ historic pragmatism and flexibility are leading it down a path where it maintains ambiguity in its short term policies (Meshaal’s statements) while preserving its longer term ideology and dedication to the Palestinian constants (Zahhar’s statements). These are not signs of moderation but rather signs that the movement has become immensely more politicized. It is currently pursuing goals which it has had for a while, except doing so much more skillfully.

What all this means is that, despite media proclamations, Hamas has not moderated its stance significantly. It has voiced consistent objectives and expectations for the Palestinian government since at least its election in 2006 when it called for a democratic, representative Palestinian government which does not blindly engage in negotiations. Its recent strategic moves (joining the PLO, adopting non-violent resistance) therefore do not signal shifts in ideology so much as a newly adopted approach to implementing its objectives. This could mean greater moderation in the coming few months, but there should be no expectation that the movement has changed its 2006 national objectives. Hamas will call for a Palestinian political establishment which is not by default based on negotiations, but which will adopt the most appropriate strategy to serve the Palestinian nation, including resistance if that is needed.

It would save both sides of the reconciliation process a lot of time, not to mention lives, if they recognized this sooner rather than later, and dealt with any discrepancies before the elections. The parties should work on presenting the electorate with a shared vision of what the framework of a future Palestinian government could look like. Abbas should recognize that if elected again, Hamas will almost certainly reassess the role of negotiations based on their perceived benefit to the Palestinian population. This time, Abbas might be more willing to understand that negotiations have indeed failed and be open to discussing alternatives with Hamas, despite the inevitable US and Israeli pressure. It is only his readiness to do so and his understanding of Hamas’ goals which will determine the success of this reconciliation effort.

[1] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Behind the Headlines: Doha Agreement between Hamas and Fatah - A barrier to peace”

Tareq Baconi has an MPhil in international relations from the University of Cambridge and is currently completing his PhD specialising in Hamas at King's College, London
This article first appeared on Open Democracy, 21st February 2012.

The foreign policy of Ron Paul

by Felipe Dittrich Ferreira

Ron Paul taking questions in Manchester, NH, 8 January 2008

Photo: Bbsrock - Wikimedia Commons

Is the US a fixer or a troublemaker? Would a less interventionist US make the treatment of international conflicts easier or harder? Ron Paul has been accused of isolationism. But it is worth taking his foreign policy more seriously.

In 2008, Democrats were voted to the White House with a clear mandate: end wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; restore the commitment of American authorities to the rule of law – stained, internationally, by Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and internally by challenges to civil liberties contained in the Patriotic Act; as well as to reverse the severe economic downturn caused by the explosion of the real estate bubble.

In the third year of his term, President Obama has finally accepted to withdraw American troops from Iraq, leaving behind a time-bomb, fuelled by sectarian tensions and geopolitical disputes. US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the meanwhile, has increased, along with the risk of civil war in both countries. In Libya, a new model for regime-change intervention was tested, setting the stage for war against Syria and Iran, under the cover of dubious UN resolutions, through the use of ‘opposition leaders’ created out of thin air or taken way out of proportion[1]. Considered unworthy of greater efforts, Yemen and Somalia have witnessed the proliferation of drone attacks. Troops have been sent to Uganda. Bahrain, on the other hand, received a blank check to act against its own people, with military support from Saudi Arabia, in the interest of stability in the Persian Gulf. Guantanamo, in the backdrop, remains a legal black hole, either from the viewpoint of international law or against the framework of the US Constitution.

Internally, stimulus policies have proved far less effective than it was assumed. The debt ceiling discussion, in this context, is not trivial: there is a limit, indeed, to what governments can do to artificially pump up business cycles. As one rating agency correctly observed, this limit has more to do with politics than with economics, in a sense, however, not so clearly understood: the problem is not partisan or electoral politics; the real issue has to do with the ability of the US government to forcibly extract higher amounts of money from the American population to sustain long-term interventionist economic policies through over-taxation and increased inflation.

Among US republican presidential candidates, one could expect strong opposition to current lines of action, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. Differences, however, have been expressed more in tone and emphasis, than in substance. Setting off a new war in the Middle East, for example, doesn’t seem to distress most of the candidates. Some seem to believe that the current administration is actually too soft with ‘non-compliant’ regimes in the region.

Representative Ron Paul, in this issue as well as in many others, stands out differently. In a recent interview on Fox News, when pressed on what the US could do to counter Iran, Paul offered an unusual set of answers: be less threatening; don’t put sanctions on them; maybe offer them friendship[2]. In another interview to the same channel, he gave more detail on his view: Iran, with that much oil, can’t make enough gasoline for itself; they don’t have intercontinental ballistic missiles; if they had a nuclear weapon, they wouldn’t dare to attack Israel; Israel – with three hundred nukes – could take care of them in minutes; the Iranians don’t have a tradition of sending troops and invading countries six thousand miles from their shores; the country has been respectful of its borders; are we going to turn the world upside down because someday they might have a nuclear weapon?[3]

Paul’s position regarding Iran is only part of a broader view – not about world peace, but rather about what the proper role of the US government is and what the real interests of the American people are. Paul believes that the presence of American troops around the world endangers rather than enhances US national security. Collateral damages and unintended consequences are some of the components of his critique of interventionism. The mujahidin of Afghanistan are a case in point, often mentioned by the candidate: trained and equipped by the US to fight Soviet occupation in the 1980s, they are now fighting American troops. A similar point could be made about the US participation in the deposition of Mohammad Mossadegh, the last democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The ousting of the secular and nationalist leader, in 1953, initially seemed to reinforce the US position in the Middle East. Statistically, it could be argued that interventions tend to create at least as many problems as they are able to solve.

In Paul’s argument, the internal dimensions of war also come to the fore. In wartime, he affirms, governments are always prone to promote security at the expense of freedom, in personal and economic terms. In one of his books, Paul recalls, in this sense, the imprisonment of American citizens of Japanese descent during the Second World War[4]. More recently, Paul heavily criticized the Obama administration for the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, born in New Mexico, with ideological connections to Al Qaeda. He was deliberately killed by a drone attack in Yemen, without civil or military trial. No evidence of his participation in direct attacks against the US has been presented[5]. In a way, this case shows that whatever a government does against foreigners, it will eventually do against its own citizens.

Many have called Paul an isolationist, claiming that, as a major power, the US must remain deeply involved in world affairs. Considering the possibility that Paul might win the election, which is not entirely unlikely, given the fact that he appeals, potentially, both to Republicans and Democrats, this charge must be carefully assessed. Internationally, the question could be presented in the following terms: the US is a fixer or a troublemaker? A less interventionist America would make the treatment of international conflicts easier or harder?

I would like to defend Paul’s stance on this debate, by attempting to explain why non-interventionism might actually present good results, in many cases. If you are an elephant inside a pottery shop, getting out of the way might not be simple, but it is better than pretending you can pick and choose what you want without causing irreversible damage. In the Middle East, to consider the most china-shop-like situation, the US has been deeply involved, taking sides, choosing winners, arming, training and financing allies. Without US involvement, would any country in the region be strong enough to impose itself over others? Could any of them wage a non-defensive war against others without facing the risk of isolation and defeat? One could reasonably argue that without interference from game-changing heavyweights from outside the region, the Middle East would naturally tend towards accommodation and equilibrium, more or less as Europe did during the XIX century.

To comprehend the current dynamics, it would be worthy applying to the Middle East a model developed by Oxford economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler to understand civil wars. In 2000, taking a large database of conflicts into account, they proved that opportunities for predation play a large role in the formation of armed groups, without which civil wars can’t occur[6]. Such wars, consequently, are more likely in countries rich in easily exploitable natural resources, particularly when other options of income are scarce, especially for young males: “unlike a protest, a rebellion which generates a civil war is a sustained, full-time effort. Adherents must eat, and so, the rebel organization is constrained to be financially viable.” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000:12). In 2006, Collier complemented the model, putting stronger emphasis on feasibility[7]. This second study, built upon improved data, sustains the contention that where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur, regardless of motivation. Feasibility, to be precise, is such a strong factor, in Collier’s view, that it can acquire a life of its own, sustaining protracted conflicts no matter the outcomes: “indeed, since the typical civil war lasts for many years and rebel victories are rare, if rebellion is rational motivations are likely to reflect benefits during conflict, rather than prospective benefits consequent upon a victory which must be heavily discounted both by time and risk”. (Collier et al, 2006:06)

I would like to argue that the US works and is seen in the Middle East as a source of financing equivalent to oil and diamonds in other areas plagued by conflict. The prospect of receiving US support, either to fight or to disarm, makes governments and groups that would otherwise refrain from conflict choose not to conciliate. In some circumstances, US support seems to compensate the costs of war in such a large proportion that stability and peace are given virtually no value. The case of Afghanistan is perhaps the best possible example of this dynamic. Why would any country remain in war for so long without any meaningful, internal, easily exploitable source of income under dispute? When there is nothing to steal, countries tend to value peace and hard work more than war and adventure.

Ron Paul, therefore, does seem to have a point. The presence of the US in situations of conflict seems to create more trouble than it solves. Unintended consequences, blowback and collateral damages are part of the problem. I propose exploring these ideas in more detail, not only in political terms, but also economically. Collier’s model seems to present a good framework for such an effort. Under that light, the foreign policy of Ron Paul might well prove to be a consistent alternative to the foreign policy doctrine developed under Bush and Obama, which combines virulence and inefficacy in self-sustaining and ever-growing proportions.

Footnotes:
[1]Roberts, Hugh. Who said Gaddafi had to go? London Review of Books, v.33, n.22, 17 NOV 2011.
[2]Fox News, November 6th 2011
[3]Fox News, August 12th 2011
[4]Paul, Ron. The Revolution – A Manifesto. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2008, p. 119.
[5]Cole, David. Killing Citizens in Secret. New York Review of Books Blog, 9 OCT 2011.
[6]Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2000.
[7]Collier, Paul et al. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2006.

Felipe Dittrich Ferreira holds a master's degree in Forced Migration from St Antony's College, University of Oxford.
This article first appeared on openDemocracy February 14, 2012

NATO vs. Syria

by Philip Giraldi

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 47th Munich Security Conference 2011
Photo: Sebastian Zwez - Wikimedia Commons

Americans should be concerned about what is happening in Syria, if only because it threatens to become another undeclared war like Libya but much, much worse. Calls for regime change have come from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who several weeks ago predicted a civil war. That is indeed likely if the largely secular and nationalist regime of Bashar al-Assad falls, pitting Sunni against Shia against Alawite. Indigenous Christians will be caught in the meat grinder. Ironically, many of the Christians in Damascus are Iraqis who experienced the last round of liberation in their own country and had to flee for their lives.

NATO is already clandestinely engaged in the Syrian conflict, with Turkey taking the lead as U.S. proxy. Ankara’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davitoglu, has openly admitted that his country is prepared to invade as soon as there is agreement among the Western allies to do so. The intervention would be based on humanitarian principles, to defend the civilian population based on the “responsibility to protect” doctrine that was invoked to justify Libya. Turkish sources suggest that intervention would start with creation of a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border and then be expanded. Aleppo, Syria’s largest and most cosmopolitan city, would be the crown jewel targeted by liberation forces.

Unmarked NATO warplanes are arriving at Turkish military bases close to Iskenderum on the Syrian border, delivering weapons from the late Muammar Gaddafi’s arsenals as well as volunteers from the Libyan Transitional National Council who are experienced in pitting local volunteers against trained soldiers, a skill they acquired confronting Gaddafi’s army. Iskenderum is also the seat of the Free Syrian Army, the armed wing of the Syrian National Council. French and British special forces trainers are on the ground, assisting the Syrian rebels while the CIA and U.S. Spec Ops are providing communications equipment and intelligence to assist the rebel cause, enabling the fighters to avoid concentrations of Syrian soldiers.

CIA analysts are skeptical regarding the march to war. The frequently cited United Nations report that more than 3,500 civilians have been killed by Assad’s soldiers is based largely on rebel sources and is uncorroborated. The Agency has refused to sign off on the claims. Likewise, accounts of mass defections from the Syrian Army and pitched battles between deserters and loyal soldiers appear to be a fabrication, with few defections being confirmed independently. Syrian government claims that it is being assaulted by rebels who are armed, trained, and financed by foreign governments are more true than false.

In the United States, many friends of Israel are on the Assad regime-change bandwagon, believing that a weakened Syria, divided by civil war, will present no threat to Tel Aviv. But they should think again, as these developments have a way of turning on their head. The best organized and funded opposition political movement in Syria is the Muslim Brotherhood.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, is executive director of the Council for the National Interest.

This article first appeared in The American Conservative on December 19, 2011

Open brief aan mevrouw Peetoom, voorzitter CDA,

over de blinde Nederlandse steun voor het lang niet zo heilige land Israel.

       

A Palestinian boy and Israeli soldier in front of the Israeli West Bank Barrier.
Picture taken by Justin McIntosh, August 2004.
Wikimedia Commons

Geachte mevrouw Peetoom,

Proficiat met “Agenda 2025,” [1] de nieuwe politieke koers van de Nederlandse Christendemocraten, waaruit ik onder andere leer dat in de visie van het CDA Nederland moet bijdragen aan internationaal recht en vrede, en uw partij het motto “van vrijblijvend naar betrokken” gaat hanteren. Met deze open brief nodig ik u uit om dit principe hard te maken in het Nederlandse buitenlands beleid, specifiek in het Israel-Palestina conflict en rond de houding van Israel in het Midden-Oosten. Nederland is het enige land in Europa dat Israel door dik en dun steunt. Sterker nog, “Nederland wil verder investeren in de band met de staat Israël,” zo staat in het regeerakkoord. Na zijn recente bezoek aan Nederland vertrok de Israëlische premier Netanyahu dan ook met de toezegging van uw partijgenoot Maxime Verhagen dat er dit jaar een Nederlandse economische missie naar Israel vertrekt. Israel biedt het Nederlandse bedrijfsleven tal van kansen, met name op het gebied van energie, water en voedsel, zo klonk het uit zijn ministerie. Het is schrijnend om vast te stellen dat dit nu juist sectoren zijn waarin Israel via zijn nederzettingenbeleid de Palestijnen de nek omdraait.

Al tientallen jaren zijn nederzettingen op de Westelijke Jordaanoever en Oost-Jeruzalem een van de belangrijkste Israëlische wapenfeiten. Per mei 2010 spreken we volgens een recent rapport [2] van de mensenrechtenorganisatie B’Tselem over meer dan een half miljoen Israëlische kolonisten in ruim 200 nederzettingen op de Westelijke Jordaanoever, die 42,8% van dat bezet gebied beslaan. Het nederzettingenbeleid komt neer op sluipende annexatie van Palestijns gebied. De bouw is strijdig met het internationaal (humanitair) recht en leidt voortdurend tot schendingen van de mensenrechten van de Palestijnen, waaronder het recht op eigendom, op gelijkheid, op een adequate levensstandaard, op vrijheid van beweging, en op zelfbeschikking. Bovendien leggen de facts on the ground, de omvangrijke wijzigingen in de ruimtelijke ordening op de Westelijke Jordaanoever, een bom onder elke onderhandeling tussen Israëli’s en Palestijnen.

Mevrouw Peetoom, uw partij kan alsnog voorwaarden stellen aan de door uw partijgenoot toegezegde missie. Zoals uw “Agenda 2025” zegt: “De grote maatschappelijke vraagstukken vragen om een sterk en moedig leiderschap binnen een andere bestuurscultuur.” Uw partij kan bovendien tal van andere initiatieven nemen om de rechten van de Palestijnen te ondersteunen. “Agenda 2025” zegt: “Een herkenbare politieke partij heeft het vermogen zich kwaad te maken, verontwaardigd te zijn over maatschappelijke misstanden.” Het Israel-Palestina conflict is een onderwerp dat toch bij uitstek valt onder die definitie. “Agenda 2025” wijst op het bestaan van “intergouvernementele organisaties”, maar ook u weet dat Israel - dat als land kon ontstaan dankzij zo’n “intergouvernementele organisatie” - elke voor haar negatieve (bindende) resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad naast zich neerlegt, nog afgezien van de talloze resoluties die door bondgenoot de Verenigde Staten door een veto worden getroffen.

Mevrouw Peetoom, vanuit “het radicale midden” kan uw partij aandringen op een drastische beleidsombuiging van de regering van een land dat voortdurend voor Israel op de bres staat. Hoezeer Nederland in de ban is van Israel komt wel heel sterk naar voren in het interview op 19 januari van Mariëlle Tweebeeke op Nieuwsuur met premier Netanyahu. Toen die ijskoud beweerde dat de Joodse nederzettingen op de Westelijke Jordaanoever maar 1½ % van dat gebied vertegenwoordigen was mevrouw Tweebeeke niet in staat met “hebben de Palestijnen dan vrijheid van handelen op 98½ % van de Westoever?” te repliceren. Mevrouw Tweebeeke slikte ook probleemloos Netanhayu’s opmerking dat de Palestijnen met hun eis van een bouwstop voorwaarden vooraf stellen voor vredesonderhandelingen. Zij had natuurlijk de vraag moeten stellen: “Maar uw regering stelt toch evenzeer eisen vooraf door te eisen door te mogen gaan met de onder internationaal recht illegale bouw van nederzettingen in bezet gebied?”

Datzelfde Israel dreigt ook - in strijd met het internationaal recht - op korte termijn Iran aan te vallen, wat rampzalige gevolgen zal hebben voor de bevolking van Iran en het Midden-Oosten, en uiteindelijk ook voor de gehele wereld. Israel probeert zo’n aanval te billijken vanuit de valse voorstelling dat Iran kernwapens zou ontwikkelen. Stelt u zich eens voor: Israel, dat geen ondertekenaar is van het nucleair non-proliferatieverdrag en illegaal beschikt over een voorraad van honderden kernwapens, verklaart dat het gerechtigd is het kernprogramma te vernietigen van Iran, een land dat het verdrag heeft ondertekend, volhoudt dat het programma bestemd is voor vreedzame doeleinden en daarom gerechtvaardigd onder het internationaal recht. Voor alle duidelijkheid, het Internationaal Atoomagentschap heeft geen enkel bewijs gevonden voor een militaire component van het Iraanse kernprogramma. Een casus belli wegens Iraanse kernwapens is even ongeloofwaardig als de Iraakse massavernietigingswapens of de kruistocht tegen Al Qaeda die de VS en zijn bondgenoten aanvoerden om Irak en Afghanistan aan te vallen, of het voorwendsel “burgers te beschermen” rond de koloniale oorlog om regimewissel in Libië. [3]

Mevrouw Peetoom, met de oorlogsdreiging probeert Israël zijn militaire dominantie in het Midden-Oosten te vrijwaren en de VS om een monopolie op de olievoorraden in de wereld uit te bouwen. Dat monopolie moet de economische en geopolitieke positie van haar belangrijkste rivalen verzwakken. China staat daarbij centraal en lijkt steeds meer het doelwit van toekomstige militaire agressie te worden. De berichtgeving in de (internationale) media probeert in alle toonaarden de publieke opinie voor te bereiden op een oorlog met Iran die honderdduizenden levens kan kosten in een land van 74 miljoen mensen. Iran zal zo’n aanval zeker vergelden met aanvallen op Israel en Amerikaanse doelen in binnen- en buitenland. Bovendien kan het conflict uitwaaieren naar Syrië, Libanon, Egypte en de Golfstaten, en mogelijk Rusland en China. Een horrorscenario.

Mevrouw Peetoom, veel mensen denken dat het Westen moet kiezen tussen Iran kernwapens laten ontwikkelen of het land aanvallen voor het beschikt over atoombommen. Maar er is een derde optie: een kernwapenvrije zone in het Midden-Oosten. Onderzoek leert dat 64% van de Israëlische Joden daar voorstander van is, zelfs als de Israëlische kernwapens dan moeten verdwijnen. Zo’n kernwapenvrije zone kan Iran moeilijk weigeren. Tijdens de Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) toetsingsconferentie van mei 2010 nam Egypte al een initiatief in die richting. [4] Intussen heeft de VS schoorvoetend het groene licht gegeven voor een NPT-conferentie over dit onderwerp, die later dit jaar in Finland wordt georganiseerd. Ook Nederland had aangegeven zo’n conferentie te willen beleggen, maar VN secretaris-generaal Ban Ki-moon lijkt zich te hebben laten leiden door de goede staat van dienst van Finland als bemiddelaar en vredestichter, en koos voor Finland [5] in plaats van Nederland, dat in de wereld toch als vurig pleitbezorger van Israel bekend staat en dus niet onpartijdig.

Mevrouw Peetoom, mag ik u uitnodigen beide zaken hoog op de politieke agenda te plaatsen: het lot van de Palestijnen, en steun voor een kernwapenvrije zone in het Midden-Oosten?

Paul Lookman
Geopolitiek in perspectief

[1] “Het CDA Strategisch Beraad 2012 presenteert: Kiezen en Verbinden; politieke visie vanuit het radicale midden”
[2] B’Tselem: “By Hook and by Crook” - July 2010
[3] Barry Grey: “The New York Times and the drive to war against Iran”
[4] Geopolitiek in perspectief: “De hypocrisie van het enige land dat ooit kernwapens heeft gebruikt”
[5] HELSINGIN SANOMAT: “Finland designated to host international conference in 2012 on nuclear weapons-free Middle East”

League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria

Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012

 

Chapter X: Evaluation

70. The purpose of the Protocol is to protect Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian Government to stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence from cities and residential neighbourhoods. This phase must lead to dialogue among the Syrian sides and the launching of a parallel political process. Otherwise, the duration of this Mission will be extended without achieving the desired results on the ground.

71. The Mission determined that there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol. This development on the ground can undoubtedly be attributed to the excessive use of force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests that occurred before the deployment of the Mission demanding the fall of the regime. In some zones, this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens, causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent citizens pay the price for those actions with life and limb.

72. The Mission noted that the opposition had welcomed it and its members since their deployment to Syria. The citizens were reassured by the Mission’s presence and came forward to present their demands, although the opposition had previously been afraid to do so publicly owing to their fear of being arrested once again, as they had been prior to the Mission’s arrival in Syria. However, this was not case in the period that followed the last Ministerial Committee statement, although the situation is gradually improving.

73. The Mission noted that the Government strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and those loyal to it.

74. In some cities, the Mission sensed the extreme tension, oppression and injustice from which the Syrian people are suffering. However, the citizens believe the crisis should be resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the reform process and bring about the change they desire. The Mission was informed by the opposition, particularly in Dar‘a, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that some of its members had taken up arms in response to the suffering of the Syrian people as a result of the regime’s oppression and tyranny; corruption, which affects all sectors of society; the use of torture by the security agencies; and human rights violations.

75. Recently, there have been incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties. These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.

76. The Mission has adhered scrupulously to its mandate, as set out in the Protocol. It has observed daily realities on the ground with complete neutrality and independence, thereby ensuring transparency and integrity in its monitoring of the situation, despite the difficulties the Mission encountered and the inappropriate actions of some individuals.

77. Under the Protocol, the Mission’s mandate is one month. This does not allow adequate time for administrative preparations, let alone for the Mission to carry out its task. To date, the Mission has actually operated for 23 days. This amount of time is definitely not sufficient, particularly in view of the number of items the Mission must investigate. The Mission needs to remain on the ground for a longer period of time, which would allow it to experience citizens’ daily living conditions and monitor all events. It should be noted that similar previous operations lasted for several months or, in some cases, several years.

78. Arab and foreign audiences of certain media organizations have questioned the Mission’s credibility because those organizations use the media to distort the facts. It will be difficult to overcome this problem unless there is political and media support for the Mission and its mandate. It is only natural that some negative incidents should occur as it conducts its activities because such incidents occur as a matter of course in similar missions.

79. The Mission arrived in Syria after the imposition of sanctions aimed at compelling to implement what was agreed to in the Protocol. Despite that, the Mission was welcomed by the opposition, loyalists and the Government. Nonetheless, questions remains as to how the Mission should fulfil its mandate. It should be noted that the mandate established for the Mission in the Protocol was changed in response to developments on the ground and the reactions thereto. Some of those were violent reactions by entities that were not mentioned in the Protocol. All of these developments necessitated an expansion of and a change in the Mission’s mandate. The most important point in this regard is the commitment of all sides to cease all acts of violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its tasks and, ultimately, lay the groundwork for the political process.

80. Should there be agreement to extend its mandate, then the Mission must be provided with communications equipment, means of transportation and all the equipment it requires to carry out its mandate on the ground.

81. On the other hand, ending the Mission’s work after such a short period will reverse any progress, even if partial, that has thus far been made. This could perhaps lead to chaos on the ground because all the parties involved in the crisis thus remain unprepared for the political process required to resolve the Syrian crisis.

82. Since its establishment, attitudes towards the Mission have been characterized by insincerity or, more broadly speaking, a lack of seriousness. Before it began carrying out its mandate and even before its members had arrived, the Mission was the target of a vicious campaign directed against the League of Arab States and the Head of the Mission, a campaign that increased in intensity after the observers’ deployment. The Mission still lack the political and media support it needs in order to fulfil its mandate. Should its mandate be extended, the goals set out in the Protocol will not be achieved unless such support is provided and the Mission receives the backing it needs to ensure the success of the Arab solution.

(signed) Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi
Head of the Mission

This report, censored by the Arab League, was obtained and made public by Inner City Press; it is reproduced here for non-profit educational purposes. See, also, Sharmine Narwani, "Foolishly Ignoring the Arab League Report on Syria" (Mideast Shuffle, 3 February 2012).

See also (quote from) “Exposed: The Arab agenda in Syria” by Pepe Escobar, Feb 4, 2012 in left column on Geopolitiek in perspectief.