donderdag 18 juli 2013

De sluipende staatsgreep in Amerika




“In het verleden hebben wij afgerekend met fascisme en communisme. Het waren niet enkel raketten en tanks die daarbij de doorslag gaven, maar ook onze sterke bondgenootschappen en trouw aan onze beginselen. Macht alleen kan ons niet beschermen, en onze macht geeft ons niet het recht om onze wil door te drukken. Onze macht neemt toe als we die verstandig gebruiken. Als wij een gerechtvaardigde zaak nastreven, het goede voorbeeld geven en ons nederig en terughoudend opstellen komt het wel goed met onze veiligheid. Als wij vasthouden aan deze beginselen kunnen wij het hoofd bieden aan de nieuwe bedreigingen die nog grotere inspanningen vergen en zelfs nog omvangrijker samenwerking en begrip tussen naties.”

Met onder andere dit onderdeel uit zijn
speech bij zijn aantreden op 20 januari 2009 spiegelde president Obama de wereld een drastische beleidsombuiging voor. In werkelijkheid zette Obama echter het beleid van George W. Bush in versterkte mate voort. Vandaag, vijf jaar later, moeten wij vaststellen dat Amerika een nationale veiligheidsstaat is geworden. Het zijn natuurlijk niet de klokkenluiders die Amerika ziek maken. De ziekte is de permanente staat van oorlog waar het land voor kiest. De “checks and balances” uit de Grondwet, die de drie machten in evenwicht moeten houden, werken niet meer. Sterker nog, de uitvoerende macht krijgt steun van de andere machten om nóg meer macht te verwerven. Uiteindelijk wordt het land bestuurd door het militair-industrieel complex en de inlichtingendiensten, waarbij de media hand- en spandiensten verlenen.

In een
opiniestuk in De Tijd komt de Leuvense politicoloog Bart Kerremans niet verder dan de vraag of het Amerikaanse beleid niet ten koste gaat van de basisprincipes van de Amerikaanse rechtsstaat. Het voortdurende onrecht in Guantanamo, de drones die ook burgerslachtoffers maken, het optreden van NSA, CIA en andere inlichtingendiensten, voor de professor zijn dat allemaal zaken die de vraag oproepen wat daarmee overeind blijft van basisbeginselen zoals privacy en de rechterlijke controle op inbreuken daarop.  Maar tegelijk toont Kerremans begrip voor de “moeilijke” positie van de president na 9/11. Hij citeert daarbij Obama, die recent nog eens heeft gezegd dat hij als president ook opperbevelhebber is en het voorkomen van een nieuwe aanslag dus zijn eerste bekommernis moet zijn. Per saldo moet voor Kerremans de president “in de grijze zone aan de rand van de rechtstaat” kunnen opereren.

Professor Kerremans zwijgt zedig over het vierde “natuurrecht” uit de Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring.[1] Dat handelt over de volkssoevereiniteit, die stoelt op de theorie van het sociale contract: politiek gezag is slechts legitiem indien het de rechten van het individu respecteert en is gebaseerd op “the consent of the governed”. Letterlijk zegt de Verklaring
: “…when a long train of abuses and usurpations ... evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government...” (als een lange reeks misbruiken en machtsoverschrijdingen … duidt op een plan hen te onderwerpen aan absolute dictatuur, is het hun recht, ja zelfs hun plicht, zo'n regering af te zetten). Men kan het huidige Amerikaanse overheidsoptreden absoluut niet rijmen met de principes van de rechtsstaat. Dat optreden is inpeachable. Het had Amerikakenner Kerremans, die regelmatig duiding komt geven op de Vlaamse publieke radio, gesierd zich wat principiëler op te stellen.

Anders dan professor Kerremans windt de Amerikaanse journalist en auteur
Chris Hedges er geen doekjes om. Sinds het om zeep helpen van de Occupy beweging voert de veiligheidsstaat een meedogenloze en in belangrijke mate clandestiene campagne om elk protest bij voorbaat de wind uit de zeilen te nemen. De bedoeling is om elke democratische volksoppositie te criminaliseren voordat die enige omvang krijgt. De door bespieding gelokaliseerde oppositiegroepen worden vroegtijdig en proactief de toegang tot publieke ruimten ontzegd, maar de groepen worden ook lastig gevallen, ondervraagd, geïntimideerd, gearresteerd en opgesloten voordat het tot protestacties kan komen. Er is een woord voor dit type politieke systeem: tirannie. Voor Hedges kan dat alleen maar leiden tot clandestien en zelfs gewelddadige verzet.

Paul Craig Roberts
spreekt onomwonden over een coup d’état in Amerika. De uitvoerende macht stelt zich boven de wet en heeft geen boodschap aan de grondwet. Burgers worden opgepakt op gezag van een bureaucraat, geïnterneerd en gefolterd. Zonder tussenkomst van een rechtbank of informatie aan familie. De “Amerikaanse Stasi” onderschept elke communicatie en kan die gebruiken om iemand als “binnenlandse terrorist” te brandmerken. Het regime duldt geen tegenspraak. Kan men een burger niet gemakkelijk oppakken, dan wordt die met een drone uit de weg geruimd, inclusief onschuldige omstanders. Uitleg is overbodig. Voor de tiran Obama is de opgeruimde mens slechts een naam op een lijst. De president heeft ijskoud verklaard dat hij beschikt over deze ongrondwettelijke rechten, en zijn regime gebruikt die om burgers in de mangel te nemen. En niemand die oproept tot afzetting van de machtsmisbruiker. Het Congres geeft forfait, de bange burgers houden zich koest. Zo kon een president die democratisch verantwoording verschuldigd is uitgroeien tot een Caesar. De uitvoerende macht heeft een geslaagde coup tegen Amerika gepleegd.

Roberts heeft als ex-lid van de uitvoerende macht recht van spreken. Het oppakken van Snowden kreeg voorrang op het respecteren van het internationaal recht en diplomatieke onschendbaarheid. Krijgt na de “aanhouding” van de Boliviaanse president Evo Morales de Britse regering straks de opdracht om
Julian Asange uit de Ecuadoriaanse ambassade te slepen om hem aan de CIA over te dragen voor waterboarding? Onder de dictatuur van Obama wordt elke Amerikaan die de waarheid zegt op de korrel genomen. Niemand minder dan de juist afgetreden minister van Binnenlandse Veiligheid Janet Napolitano heeft verklaard dat de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst haar aandacht had verlegd van moslimterroristen naar “binnenlandse extremisten”. Dat is een rekbaar en ongedefinieerd begrip waar men gemakkelijk klokkenluiders als Bradley Manning en Edward Snowden onder kan laten vallen, net als een ieder die het regime met onthullingen in verlegenheid kan brengen.

Sinds het eind van de Koude Oorlog, toen Amerika als enige supermacht op het wereldtoneel overbleef, is het land veranderd, een fenomeen dat sinds 9/11 is versneld. De checks and balances[2] uit de grondwet blijven dode letter. De drie machten zijn geruisloos samengesmolten tot een machtsblok dat geen enkele boodschap heeft aan we, the people.[3] Het land heeft een sluipende staatsgreep ondergaan. Het regime steunt op geheime rechtscolleges en omvangrijk en onrechtmatig toezicht op bevolkingen in binnen- en buitenland. Amerika is uitgegroeid tot de enige schurken-supermacht ter wereld. O ironie: waar in de twintigste eeuw heel wat dictaturen werden vervangen door democratische regeringen, steekt in het zo bewonderde Amerika van de vrijheid, de oudste democratie, het totalitarisme de kop weer op.

De criminelen in Washington kunnen maar overleven zo lang als het regime de waarheid kan onderdrukken. Legt de Amerikaanse bevolking zich neer bij de staatsgreep, dan onderwerpt het zich aan de tirannie. Maar elders in de wereld groeit het verzet tegen de wereldmacht die ten koste van alles zijn wil doordrukt, zijn macht niet verstandig gebruikt, geen gerechtvaardigde zaak nastreeft, niet het goede voorbeeld geeft en zich bij lange na niet nederig en terughoudend opstelt, zaken die de aantredende president in 2009 zo plechtig beloofde. De val van het Amerikaanse imperium is nog slechts een kwestie van tijd.



[1] Bart Kerremans: “Op verkenning in het Amerikaanse federale politieke systeem” (november 2004), p. 9-11
[2] Ibid,, p. 31
[3] Ibid., p. 27

donderdag 11 juli 2013

China (and UK) head towards bad error on energy

 by Michael Meacher

Fukushima I nuclear accident diagram. Key: 1 Reactor building; 2 Turbine generator & associated condenser; 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 trenches & pipe tunnels;
Author: Nesnad (source: Wikimedia Commons)

The nuclear industry and its cheerleader DECC [1] will be pleased at today’s announcement that China has re-started its nuclear programme after an 18 month hiatus following Fukushima. The Chinese government have made clear they remain very concerned about the safety issue, as well they should be – Fukushima came very close to making Tokyo uninhabitable for decades to come – but once again industry lobbies have prevailed over sober analysis and common sense. The decision by China and the UK is of course taken on purely economic and industrial grounds,
marginalising whatever environmental considerations there might be, but sadly it is also a view taken on very different grounds by such splendid environmental campaigners as George Monbiot and Mark Lynas [2], for both of whom I have enormous respect. But in this matter they are wrong.

The only plausible environmental case for nuclear is that climate change is the greatest threat facing humanity, fossil fuels therefore have to be phased out as quickly as feasible, and nuclear is then the best (or even only) means to fill the gap. This argument is deeply wrong-headed, as the figures irrefutably show. In 2010 the world demand for primary energy was equivalent to 12,000 million tons of oil (Mtoe), 87% of which was provided by oil, coal and gas. Nuclear power contributed 5%, renewables 8%. To reverse climate change, carbon emissions must be reduced to below their present level, let alone turnaround the current accelerating increase. Can nuclear do that? Suppose there is a (modest) 2% growth in primary energy demand per year for the next 35 years; demand will then double to 24,000 Mtoe. If nuclear power is to absorb all that growth and substitute (say) 4,000 Mtoe of coal, it will have to produce 16,000 Mtoe of energy per year. That is a 25-fold increase on its present level. That level is today provided globally by 440 nuclear reactors, so 25 times that means 11,000 reactors. That means building on average one a day over the next 35 years.

Since nuclear power generation has
flatlined over the last decade and sharply declined in the last few years, that seems inconceivable. The economics of nuclear power are increasingly unattractive – from mounting construction costs (currently £6bn per reactor, and rising), long lead time (up to 10 years), uncertainty over future electricity pricing, political hazard (the decision of Germany, Austria, Switzerland to withdraw from nuclear after Fukushima), and vast long-term liabilities (no less that 86% of the current DECC budget goes towards decommissioning old nuclear power stations).

So is there an alternative? There is: non-hydro renewables are growing very fast, by 15% a year by 2010. During 2005-10 global solar hot water and wind power capacity both grew by 25% a year, and global solar PV capacity by 50% a year. If those growth rates were sustained, wind capacity would rise 6,300-fold to 1.25m GW, solar hot water to 1.15m GW, and solar PV to 1.6m GW – the latter alone producing over 1,000 times projected world’s primary energy demand in 25 years. Nuclear is dangerous and prohibitively costly, renewables are attractive with falling costs and a potential creator of millions of jobs worldwide.

Michael Meacher is a Labour MP for Oldham West and Royton (UK)
This article first appeared on Michael Meacher’s weblog on October 25, 2012

[1] UK’s Department of Energy & Climate Change (editor’s note)
[2] Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (editor’s note)
[3] British authors, journalists and environmental activists (editor’s note)     

vrijdag 28 juni 2013

Woolwich and Afghanistan: the connection


by Paul Rogers 23 May 2013

  A funeral for victims of a US drone strike.

An understanding of the link between the shocking murder of a young soldier on a London street and "remote-control" attacks by western states is essential.

In the London bombings of 7 July 2005 (“7/7”), explosions on three underground trains and a bus killed fifty-two people as well as the four bombers and injured hundreds. Soon afterwards it became clear that the four bombers came from Leeds and Dewsbury in west Yorkshire, 200 miles north of London, and the media quickly descended on the neighbourhoods. On a number of occasions newspaper and TV journalists asked young people of Pakistani origins for their reactions, and these were almost always of horror and condemnation of the bombers and what they had done.

Not infrequently, though, they also referred to Iraq, where the post-invasion violence was at its height. Fifty-two innocent people died in London on 7/7 but that was the average daily death-toll in Iraq - day after day and week after week. The connection was not difficult to make and was reinforced by one of the "suicide videos" released in the wake of the London attacks. It was also angrily and predictably denied by Tony Blair and his government, even if it struck something of a chord with many people in Britain.

Eight years on, British troops have long since left Iraq. That was one of Gordon Brown's less noticed decisions, but it also involved a quid pro quo for Barack Obama in the form of a greater UK commitment to Afghanistan. That war has scarcely been more popular in Britain than was the one in Iraq, but the media attention is far lower and any link between the Woolwich atrocity and Afghanistan is almost entirely discounted.

In part this is explainable by the sheer horror of the action and the immediate spread of appalling images through new social media and the main broadcast and print media. The shock is there, it is visceral, and surely needs no explaining.  It is sheer terrorism.

And yet this is not enough.

The new social media may provide vivid and grim dispersal of the Woolwich murder but that same media does the same for the numerous armed-drone attacks in Afghanistan, Yemen and Pakistan, including two drone-strikes in Yemen in the past week alone. These and their counterparts go virtually unreported in the establishment western press; indeed the public image in Britain is of a war rapidly winding down in Afghanistan and hardly observed in Yemen or Somalia, let alone Pakistan.

Where the disconnect lies is in the near-universal lack of knowledge of the intensity of the armed-drone operations as these replace “boots on the ground”. This lack of knowledge has two elements. The first is that the attacks have been numerous. The United States may be the major user of armed-drones in Afghanistan, with over a thousand operations through to the end of 2012, but the UK follows quite closely behind with 349.

The second is the absence of any information on casualties, except for the occasional naming of middle-ranking commanders who may die. This “we don't do body-counts” policy is persistent and was practised to remarkable effect in the air war in Libya in 2011.

At that time, Britain's ministry of defence would - day after day - release details of targets hit by bombs and missiles. These might be rocket-launchers, tank-transporters, anti-aircraft radars or psychological-warfare centres; but the remarkable thing was that no mention was made of people ever getting killed - and this was despite the ready availability of high-resolution bomb-damage assessment (essential in case of the need for retargeting). It was as if every time a bomb or missile was about to strike, the clever people around the target could jump out of the way in a matter of microseconds and escape entirely unharmed.  The end result of this was that, to all intents and purposes, no one was getting killed or injured - at least as far as most of the UK media was concerned.

The same applies to Britain's armed-drone attacks in Afghanistan, with one difference: that the new social media, linked to the work of Islamist propagandists, is assiduously used to spread the reality of the strikes in a way that simply did not happen in Libya.

The appalling nature and the open shock of the Woolwich murder are such that it is expecting far too much for this Afghan connection to have any traction with public opinion. Yet there is a connection and the full picture is incomplete without it.

The steady move from boots-on-the-ground to "remote control" has created an apparent assumption that people in the west are safely anaesthetised from the impact - whether it be in Afghanistan, Yemen or, perhaps in the near future, Nigeria as well as Mali

We are not.

It is understandable that the murder of the young soldier is too grim and violent for that to be seen. But perhaps we will somehow have to make that imaginative leap if, in the longer term, we are to avoid further instances of such extreme violence on our streets.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century(Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers

This article first appeared on openDemocracy 23 May 2013.

vrijdag 7 juni 2013

An arms craze: drones to lasers


 

Scud B. A tactical, mobile, ballistic missile, it could deliver a conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads to a target about 320 kilometers (200 miles) away.
(Picture courtesy Wikimedia Commons. Author: Dennis Mosher, 1978).

The United States, Israel and other military powers continue to seek the perfect weapon - from "unmanned aerial vehicles" to "directed energy". They forget how the story ends.

The occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in August 1990 was followed by the United States-led assault of January 1991 which expelled the Iraqi forces. The coalition assembled by Washington enjoyed great military superiority, but among the problems it faced was Iraq's ability to fire Scud missiles, initially against Israel and later against coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The Scuds, based on crude Soviet missile technology of the 1950s, were highly inaccurate, but when aimed at large enough targets such as military bases or ports still had some potential to do damage.

This was shown when a Scud hit a US marines’ depot in Saudi Arabia, killing twenty-eight soldiers - the worst loss of life for the Americans in the war. And in another incident which did not enter the public domain at the time, a Scud landed in the sea within 300 metres of a US navy support-ship moored at the Saudi port of Al-Jubayl alongside a large jetty laden with munitions and fuel. It was a narrow miss; if the military depot had been hit the effects would have been calamitous.

This incident was among the factors that prompted the Pentagon to invest heavily in missile defences, with missiles such as the Scud prominent in its thinking at the time. An early centrepiece of this effort, which continued to develop even amid the winding down of the cold war, was a weapon that seemed to come from the realms of science fiction: the airborne-laser (ABL) (see "Directed energy: a new kind of weapon”, 31 July 2002).

This project consumed hundreds of millions of dollars in the late 1990s, and by early in the new century was moving into the testing phase. At its centre was a modified Boeing 747 housing a powerful three-megawatt chemical oxygen-iodine laser with a highly accurate optical system, which could be aimed at missiles soon after their launch. The laser, travelling at the speed of light, had a reported range of up to around 650 kilometres; thus it could patrol outside the airspace of an opponent such as Iran or North Korea. It was calculated that the casing of these missiles, under gravitational stresses as they rapidly accelerated in the boost phase of their flight-path, would be subject to the intense heat of the laser - and thus crumple and collapse.

The system was soon attracting considerable interest. By 2003, the US air force was thinking about the possible use of airborne lasers to hit ground-targets such as barracks, depots or fuel-tankers. Indeed, the very idea of “directed-energy” weapons seemed, for military planners, to amount almost to a perfect weapon. For if, the planners thought, the function of a weapon is to deliver energy to disrupt a target, then ideally it should be very long-range, ultra-fast and impeccably accurate.

Yet even at that stage there were signs that the dream was beginning to turn sour. The entire programme was proving far more difficult to execute and much more costly than anticipated, with too many of the technologies simply too experimental. A couple of successful tests were finally carried out in 2010. But by then support in Congress was slipping; funding was cut at the end of that year, and the whole project was cancelled in late 2011.

That might have been the end of the story: an “ideal” weapon that was just too difficult to develop. But there is a sequel. In mid-April 2013 the US navy announced that a fully operational laser-weapon is to be mounted on a command-ship, the USS Ponce, deployed in the Persian Gulf. Its main purpose is to provide defence against armed drones and small speedboats (see Grace Jean, ”USN to deploy solid-state laser weapon on USS Ponce”, Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 2013).

This laser-weapon system (LaWS) is on a much smaller scale than the airborne laser; it has kilowatt power rather than megawatt, and uses commercially available components. But it is part of a much wider move to develop tactical directed-energy weapons, with this time the US navy at the forefront (see Richard Scott, “Rays of light: can shipborne laser weapons deliver”, Jane's International Defence Review, March 2011).

Moreover, the idea is still very much alive beyond the United States. Israel and China are among other countries getting in on the act, and there is every indication that a number of new directed-energy weapons will be fielded in the coming decade. The airborne laser may have been a technological step too far, but for militaries around the world the overall concept retains great appeal.

The drone link

There is, though, a catch. What works for the military may also work for the paramilitary, especially as the widespread use of quite powerful lasers in industry means that civil laser technologies can readily be modified by sub-state actors.

There is an analogy here with the development of armed-drones. In this area the United States and Israel are in the lead, several years ahead of western European countries as well as Russia and China. But others, including Iran, are following suit (Israel said on 25 April 2013 that it had shot down yet another drone, launched from southern Lebanon - presumably by Iran's ally Hizbollah). So too, with directed-energy weapons. For now, the United States and Israel are in the front rank; but within a few years there will be a proliferation, first to middle-ranking powers and then to non-state actors (see "An asymmetrical drone war", 19 August 2010).

What links armed-drones and directed-energy weapons is that neither is subject to any kind of international arms-control process. Nor is one envisaged. Once again, the armourers are way ahead of the arms controllers. That will almost certainly remain the case, which reinforces the significant of the USS Ponce's deployment. Almost without noticing it, the world is creeping into yet another era of warfare. The outcomes of this new era are unpredictable, though one thing is almost certain: it will involve proliferation to multiple actors - both states and paramilitaries alike.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century(Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers

This article first appeared on openDemocracy 2 May 2013.