The roots of the most recent crisis in Iraq can be traced to the US-led
invasion of 2003 and western meddling in Syria. At stake, is the neoliberal
blueprint of post-invasion Iraq, now defended in an effort coordinated between
the Baghdad government and its western backers.
Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld gestures to emphasize his point during a press briefing with
Ambassador Paul Bremer in the Pentagon on July 24, 2003. Rumsfeld and Bremer
briefed reporters about the coalition progress in Iraq. Photo: R.D. Ward, 24 July 2003, Wikimedia
Commons.
What today is ISIS, the
self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), was founded as an
Al-Qaida´s franchise in Iraq in direct response to the US-led invasion. The
group thrived in the security vacuum the invaders created by dismantling the
Iraqi security apparatus. At the time, Amnesty International criticized the US
for not sufficiently investing in the security of civilians, while guarding oil
fields around the clock. Needless to say, oil was the primary motive behind the invasion.
Dismantling Iraq´s security
infrastructure entailed the dismissal of over 400.000 soldiers and intelligence
personnel. With one stroke of the pen, Paul Bremer, who headed the occupation
forces in Iraq, granted jihadi groups the ultimate recruitment ground: an
´army´ of jobless men who know their way around weapons. It was only a matter
of time before various armed groups were rampaging through the country. Among
those, the Islamic State of Iraq, ISIS before expanding to Syria, won most
infamy for targeting Shia.
Then, as now, western designs for
Iraq were at the root of the sectarian logic of the violence. From his office
in one of Saddam´s former palaces, Bremer issued his first ‘order’, which
banned all public sector employees affiliated with Saddam´s Bath party from
current and future employment by government, including a majority who had party
membership forced upon them.
Although victimized like all
other groups, Sunnis were favoured by the Saddam regime and thus
disproportionately targeted by ‘de-Bathification’. In fact, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think tank, Sunni Arabs were “treated (...) as
representatives of an oppressive state structure in need of dismantling” which “sent
the message that de-Bathification was tantamount to de-Sunnification.”
Even when disregarding Bremer’s
first order, post-Saddam Iraq was sectarian by design. As ICG explains, the US “enforced
stringent security measures in Sunni-populated areas, even those traditionally
hostile to the former regime” and built a political system “along ethnic and
sectarian lines, making clear that Sunni Arabs would be relegated to a minor
role”.
In doing so, the US essentially
reproduced the British colonial legacy of ruling Iraq by sectarian division,
with predictable outcomes. Although useful allies are co-opted regardless of
sect, consecutive Shia majority governments have divided public position and
resources on an ethno-sectarian basis. Meanwhile, elastic de-Bathification laws
continue to deprive many Sunni families from employment and pensions, while
equally flexible ‘anti-terrorism’ laws are used to eliminate political
opponents of the establishment, including key figures in the Sunni community.
Against this backdrop, peaceful
protests were staged in Sunni-majority areas in 2012 following the arrest of
bodyguards working for Rafi Al-Issawi, a prominent Sunni politician. The protesters consisted primarily of
ordinary people demanding decent living conditions and an end to Sunni
exclusion by the government as well as political factions, ranging from
militants to those seeking concessions from Baghdad.
The government responded
violently. Four months after the demonstrations started, a protest camp in
Hawija (Kirkuk province) was raided leaving dozens dead and over 100 wounded.
Violence escalated, empowering militant groups, primarily ISIS. Soon, sectarian
hostilities soared to levels unseen since the height of the US-occupation,
reaching a monthly death toll of approximately 1000 by January this year.
The recent meteoric ascent of
ISIS in Iraq, having been largely contained by around 2010, is closely tied to
its newly acquired position in Syria. There, it has trained fresh fighters,
amassed advanced weapons and found new financial resources to an extent
unimaginable without de facto western support.
ISIS troops have reportedly
received training from US instructors at a secret base in Jordan. At the Turkish border with Syria, NATO - represented
by Germany, the US and the Netherlands - deployed patriot missiles and 1200 troops, prompting any Syrian pilot to think twice before
venturing within NATO´s reach in northern Syria, the location of the main ISIS
strongholds. The US has knowingly contributed to shipments of weapons most of which have been delivered to jihadi hardliners fighting Bashar
Al-Assad.
But when ISIS took control over
large swathes of territory in western Iraq, the US administration quickly sent
Apache helicopters, drones and hell-fire missiles to the embattled Iraqi regime
it had once installed. Targeting Al-Assad is fine, but turning your weapons
against a US ally is a different matter altogether. It appears one man´s
freedom fighter can be the same man’s terrorist.
For much the same reason, New
York, London and Paris newspapers devoted their headlines to ISIS when it
reemerged in Iraq, but were largely silent when the same ‘terrorist liberators’
were committing gruesome atrocities in Syria, ranging from summary executions of civilians, to imposing misogynist laws and the recruitment of child soldiers.
Likewise, atrocities committed by
the Iraqi army while “fighting terrorism” are generally withheld from
mainstream media audiences. When ISIS troops raised their black-and-white
banners in Fallujah, the city was indiscriminately shelled by the US-armed Iraqi forces. The newly obtained hellfire missiles killed unarmed civilians, including children. With this in mind, some 500,000 people fled from Mosul after it was seized by ISIS, more out of fear of the
Government´s response than jihadi extremism.
The success of a few thousand
ISIS troops facing a US-backed army, is dependent upon the support of Iraqi Sunni fighters and at least
some tolerance by the civilian population. Further alienated by recent
government violence and in some cases out of sheer self-defence against
indiscriminate cruelty, a significant section of the Sunni community has felt
compelled to strike a Faustian bargain with ISIS against the central government. More than just a jihadi
exploit, the advance of ISIS thus represents widespread popular opposition to
the ruling elite after peaceful resistance was thwarted.
Mainstream reporting is all but
entirely oblivious of the above, reducing the whole affair to purported ‘ancient
hatreds’ between Shia and Sunnis. It should be common sense, however, that
sectarianism, in Iraq and elsewhere, is an elite-constructed vehicle to channel
popular dissent in a manner that maintains the status quo. In the case of Iraq,
this amounts to preserving western interests at the cost of the common people.
The protesters in Tikrit and
Anbar were demanding an end to corruption, poverty, unemployment and shortages
of water and electricity. These grievances are at the root of popular dissatisfaction
and by extension the advance of ISIS. Though articulated in sectarian language,
they target the very economic architecture of post-invasion Iraq.
Under military occupation, Bremer’s
infamous orders transformed Iraq into a neoliberal, free-market paradise. Order number 39 for example, allowed
the unrestricted, tax-free export of profits by corporations and granted them
40-years ownership licenses. Order number 12 lifted all protection of Iraqi
industries.
In exclusive hotels, public firms
were auctioned at fire-sales prizes to foreign investors and the newly-arrived
pro-US elite. Most importantly, Iraqi oil has been all but privatized and is exploited by multinational corporations without parliamentary
approval. The lion’s share of profits accrues to western oil giants.
From a US perspective, it does
not matter who is the president of Iraq as long as the current arrangement is
maintained. This is why it may be advantageous for the US to replace Maliki with another ‘manager’.
The consequences of neoliberalism in the Third World are well-known. Multinationals virtually own the
economy, sharing part of it with a local elite that ensures the continuation of
neoliberal policies. The crumbs that fall off their dinner table are then
tossed to the population, which translates into the grievances of, for
instance, the protestors in western Iraq.
Of course, there is nothing ‘Sunni’
about such grievances, which torment all ordinary Iraqis and have incited them regularly. This explains why several Shia leaders publicly supported the Sunni majority protests. The habitual response
of the ruling elite, however, was to recast the protests as an existential
threat to the Shia, to the detriment of inter-sectarian class-solidarity. The
chances of a united anti-establishment movement, potentially threatening the
current order Iraq, further declined.
In this context, the central government
exaggerated the ‘terror’ threat, opting for an iron fist instead of genuine
security measures. For example, before the elections, Fallujah was willing “to
evict the jihadis if guaranteed it would not face regime attacks”. But the
Prime Minister did not order his troops to retreat for he had “staked his
re-election on an anti-terrorism campaign with a crude sectarian cast”, says ICG.
Apart from deepening sectarian
divides, the above has rallied the Shia behind a status quo government, to the
advantage of Maliki and his foreign backers, who, unsurprisingly, share his ‘terror is upon us’ discourse. Even members of the Sadrist movement, the most potent and popular anti-establishment force in the Shia
community, are now volunteering to fight alongside government troops,
unwittingly defending their own poverty.
Meanwhile, mainstream western
media continue to reduce the crisis to ‘Arab-looking’ men wielding beards and
Kalashnikovs and spreading terror in a sectarian quagmire. This orientalist frame conveniently obscures what lies behind the turmoil, rendering
terror and sectarian violence a ‘natural’ phenomenon to the Arab world,
entirely detached from western involvement. And so, while Iraqis, who are
massacred by the thousands, are portrayed as sectarian fanatics, western
military superpowers can plead innocent once again.
Ali Al-Jaberi is a journalist and
political scientist. Former correspondent in the Middle East and lecturer in
International Relations.
This article first appeared on openDemocracy 1
July 2014.
Posts
