by
Paul
Rogers
 |
|
U.S.
Sailors launch an F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft assigned to Strike
Fighter Squadron (VFA) 213 from the flight deck of the aircraft
carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in the Persian Gulf
Oct. 18,
2014, as the ship supports Inherent Resolve. President Barack Obama
authorized humanitarian aid deliveries to Iraq as well as targeted
airstrikes to protect U.S. personnel from extremists
known as the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. U.S. Central Command directed
the operations.
Photo:
MC3 Joshua Card – Wikimedia Commons
|
Behind
the flux of conflict on the ground in Syria-Iraq, all sides are
digging in for a long war.
Much
of the recent attention on the war against Islamic State has focused
on the intense conflict between the movement and local Kurds in and
around Kobane, close to the Syria-Turkey border. Its 60,000 people
had been relatively undisturbed by the Syrian war until a few months
ago, when thousands of people displaced by the escalating conflict
began to swell its population.
Within
a short period, as many as 400,000 had arrived. Most fled across the
border to Turkey
when the town was besieged by Islamic State (IS) militias. Today,
control of otherwise deserted and ravaged Kobane is divided between
these militias and Kurdish fighters, including some from Kurdish Iraq
(see Tim Arango, “In
Syria battle, a test for all sides”, New
York Times,
20 November 2014)
Kobane
is strategically important for IS, not least as seizing it would give
the movement command of a long stretch of the border.
The repeated targeting of IS positions by US airstrikes has made the
battle there even more pivotal. At the same time, it is but one part
of a wider war with many other elements. Three of these involve
western
and Iraqi governments, and three the Islamic State.
In
the first category:
- The Pentagon is deploying a further 1,500 troops to Iraq. This will take the acknowledged total to around 3,000, although this may not include special-force units whose deployment is seldom reported
- The US chair of the joint chiefs of staff, General Martin Dempsey, has not ruled out deploying US ground troops to the frontline with Iraq army units
- Both US and Iraqi sources have strongly discounted talk of an Iraqi army “spring offensive” in Anbar province in 2015, on the basis that rebuilding, retraining and re-equipping Iraq's army will take many months.
In
the second category:
- The Islamic State is reported to have concluded some sort of limited agreement with the al-Nusra Front (the al-Qaida affiliate in Syria) in order to bring inter-militia violence to an end there. In turn this development follows al-Nusra’s success in capturing a number of towns and villages from other Syrian militias with a more secular agenda
Al-Nusra
is also reported to have overrun arms dumps containing modern weapons
provided by western states for use against Bashar al-Assad's regime.
These may include as many as eighty US-made BGM-71 anti-tank missiles
(see Columb Strack, “Jihadists
make gains in Syria after weapons seizure”, Jane’s
Intelligence Review,
December 2014).
- The Islamic State has reputedly secured the allegiance of the most violent of Egypt's militant groups, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (see David D Kirkpatrick, “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS”, New York Times, 10 November 2014). If confirmed this would be its biggest international boost, as the group is fighting Abdel Fattah al-Sisi government in Cairo and challenging the latter's violent suppression of Islamist and other dissent (see Sara Khorshid, “Egypt’s new police state”, New York Times, 17 November 2014).
- Iraqi Kurdish sources say that western agencies are underestimating IS's military capacity. The true number of IS paramilitaries may be over six times larger than the 31,500 often quoted (see Patrick Cockburn, “War with ISIS: Islamic militants have army of 200,000, claims senior Kurdish leader”, Independent on Sunday, 16 November 2014).
The
narrative
In
other aspects of this complex conflict, the Islamic State's ability
to make major advances has stalled.
The movement is now preparing for a long conflict. A priority will be
maintaining and enhancing its transnational support, in terms both of
personnel (an estimated 15,000 have already come to join
IS from across the Middle East and beyond, but it needs more) and
finance (with individuals in western Gulf states playing a key role).
These efforts require IS to determinedly promote its core narrative,
which may be extreme by western perceptions but does have a
sufficient basis to attract support.
This
sees the Islamic State as a vanguard movement in the global defence
of Islam at a time when Islam is under attack and leaders of Muslim
states across the Middle East are either apostate or utterly untrue
to the tenets of Islam. The movement has established a renewed
caliphate, currently centred on Raqqa
(the early capital of the most durable caliphate, the Abbasids of
1,200 years ago) with plans to extend it to Baghdad (the later and
much longer-lasting Abbasid
capital. In turn it will spread to Saudi Arabia, ousting the House
of Saud and claiming guardianship of Mecca and Medina (sites of
the "two holy places") - and, ultimately, reclaim the
"third holy place" in Jerusalem.
The
Islamic State is leading this historic renewal against the "far
enemy" of the United States and its allies that have brought
chaos to Afghanistan and Iraq, killing over 200,000 Muslims and
wounding many more in the process. These enemy forces have also
killed Muslims in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Mali and many
other states, while propping up corrupt and un-Islamic
regimes (al-Sisi’s Egypt being the latest). IS points to the far
enemy’s practice of rendition, torture and detention without trial,
and it emphasises the role of the Zionists. Indeed, Israel is seen as
little more than an extension
of the United States, and Israel strike-aircraft and
helicopter-gunships as US military hardware with Israeli markings.
The
prospect
The
reality of the Islamic State is very different from its
self-portrait. The progress it has made since mid-2014 has owed much
to largely secular Ba'athists and others who hardly buy into its
theology or long-term vision are prepared to make common cause
against the hated Iraqi government and the United States. The
narrative does resonate, though, with a small minority of young
Muslims, for whom Islamic State answers
a longing even more seductive than did al-Qaida after 9/11. The fact
that IS has created a territorial entity, a physical manifestation of
the promised
caliphate, adds to its aura.
This
narrative is not easy for western analysts to comprehend, especially
given the brutality of many of the movement’s operations. But it is
being worked on and developed
relentlessly, then propagated over and over in many different forms
(especially through new social media). It is helped greatly by the
actions
of the Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu, and would dearly
like a serious ground war with western troops - which the current
"mission-creep" may well provide. If that war comes, there
will no doubt be elements in Islamic State that look forward to the
capture of American soldiers, their detention, waterboarding, and on
camera execution in orange jump-suits.
Perhaps
a few western policy-advisers and analysts are thinking such a
narrative through, recognising its seductive nature and acting
accordingly. There is, though, not too much sign of that, which makes
it all the more likely that this will be a lengthy war.
Paul
Rogers is professor in the department
of peace studies at
Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's
international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column
on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly
briefing for the Oxford
Research Group.
His books include Why
We’re Losing the War on Terror
(Polity,
2007), and Losing
Control: Global Security in the 21st Century
(Pluto
Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers
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