Migration, climate and security: the choice

Demonstration by immigrants in Treviso, Italy, 28 May 2005.

Photo: Gary Houston Ghouston - (Wikimedia Commons)

by Paul Rogers

The forces driving people's movement into Europe were already apparent in a near forgotten incident of 1991.

In August 1991, with the world’s media dominated by the chronic instability in Russia and the aftermath of the violent eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait earlier that year, a sequence of events in the Adriatic Sea provides an uncanny foretaste of the current surge of desperate people across the Mediterranean from north Africa, as well as overland from Syria through Turkey, Greece and beyond.

One consequence of the collapse of the Soviet bloc was the disintegration of the already weakened Albanian economy in the winter of 1990-91. The long-time leader Enver Hoxha, who died in 1985, had bequeathed a stagnant and unstable economy which, by the end of the decade, was ensuring increasing poverty in an already poor country. In the early months of 1991, many young Albanians were attempting to get across the Adriatic to a better life in Italy. They had little success.

Then, in August, the situation had become so desperate that merchant ships were hijacked by thousands of young people, especially in the port of Durrës, and the crews forced to set sail for Italy. At least 10,000 of them were on the 8,000-tonne merchant ship Vlora - some reports said twice that number - when it made the 200-kilometre crossing to the southern Italian port of Bari. Caught by surprise, the police there tried and failed to stop the refugees coming ashore; some even jumped overboard to swim towards land. The incident made news across Europe, at least for a couple of days, but then the media moved on.

Faced with this huge number of sudden arrivals, the police rounded them up and detained them in the only place in the city that could handle such a number securely, namely the local football stadium. There, they started the process of enforced repatriation to Albania. A few were allowed to stay; most were forced home. But the Italians did at least provide substantial financial aid to the faltering government in Tirana, and even arranged for Italian army units to distribute food within the country.

Within a few months, Albania began to make a slow and tortuous recovery. All that was left of the experience were images of desperate people jumping off a ship and trying to get ashore. Today, however, the resonance with people clambering ashore from flimsy dinghies onto Greek islands - or facing police in the centre of Budapest - is all too apparent.

The long-term view

Over the years since it began in 2001, this column has on occasion highlighted a prescient comment made in 1974 by the economic geographer Edwin Brooks. This warned of a dystopic world that had to be avoided: “a crowded glowering planet of massive inequalities of wealth buttressed by stark force yet endlessly threatened by desperate people in the global ghettoes” (see "The Implications of Ecological Limits to Growth in Terms of Expectations and Aspirations in Developed and Less Developed Countries", in Anthony Vann & Paul Rogers (eds), Human Ecology and World Development [Plenum Press, 1974]).

This is a forewarning of the experience of recent months: namely, desperate people fleeing the war-zones of Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan and the repression of Eritrea; but also of the millions more who face relative poverty and marginalisation, not least across sub-Saharan Africa.

There has been some humanitarian reaction in Europe to these forces. But the more general response has been the "securitisation" of the issue, whereby migrants are seen as threats. One head of government, the UK’s David Cameron, deliberately used the term “swarm” to describe the few thousand migrants who had got as far as Calais - though these actually form a tiny proportion of the hundreds of thousands of people desperate to get into Europe (see "Mediterranean dreams, climate realities", 23 April 2015).

It may be that over the coming months, humanitarian concern will prevail and European states will find ways to cooperate more effectively. But the prognosis is not good. And in the longer term, an extension of the securitising approach will be even more damaging as it is applied not just to the movement of people but to the closely related area of climate change.

A recent article by Nick Buxton and Ben Hayes focuses on this issue (see "Ten years on: Katrina, militarisation and climate change", 28 August 2015). It points to the manner in which the future effects of climate change are being seen as threats to the wellbeing of comfortable peoples in the west, implying that what is needed is to put much more emphasis on maintaining security rather than preventing the excesses of climate disruption.

Where the two elements come together - current migration issues and future climate disruption - will actually be in Europe. Around the continent are large centres of population in the Middle East, south-west Asia, north Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, where climate change, if not prevented, will lead to marked decreases in rainfall with declining food production and consequent social and economic hardship. The asymmetric nature of climate change as it is now being understood means that these large regions surrounding one of the richest parts of the world will have the greatest difficulties. As a result, they are likely to become drivers of migration to a far larger extent, with numbers measured not in the hundreds of thousands but in millions.

In these circumstances, the consequences of securitising these issues will be huge, far greater than anything yet experienced. For this reason alone, it is essential that the current crisis is handled primarily with humanitarian concern, rather than by trying to “close the castle gates” - which in any case is impossible in a globalised system. What happened to the Vlora nearly twenty-five years ago sharpens the choice over these possible futures.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers

This article first appeared on openDemocracy September 3, 2015

An arms craze: drones to lasers

by Paul Rogers

 

Scud B. A tactical, mobile, ballistic missile, it could deliver a conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads to a target about 320 kilometers (200 miles) away.

(Picture courtesy Wikimedia Commons. Author: Dennis Mosher, 1978).

The United States, Israel and other military powers continue to seek the perfect weapon - from "unmanned aerial vehicles" to "directed energy". They forget how the story ends.

The occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in August 1990 was followed by the United States-led assault of January 1991 which expelled the Iraqi forces. The coalition assembled by Washington enjoyed great military superiority, but among the problems it faced was Iraq's ability to fire Scud missiles, initially against Israel and later against coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. The Scuds, based on crude Soviet missile technology of the 1950s, were highly inaccurate, but when aimed at large enough targets such as military bases or ports still had some potential to do damage.

This was shown when a Scud hit a US marines’ depot in Saudi Arabia, killing twenty-eight soldiers - the worst loss of life for the Americans in the war. And in another incident which did not enter the public domain at the time, a Scud landed in the sea within 300 metres of a US navy support-ship moored at the Saudi port of Al-Jubayl alongside a large jetty laden with munitions and fuel. It was a narrow miss; if the military depot had been hit the effects would have been calamitous.

This incident was among the factors that prompted the Pentagon to invest heavily in missile defences, with missiles such as the Scud prominent in its thinking at the time. An early centrepiece of this effort, which continued to develop even amid the winding down of the cold war, was a weapon that seemed to come from the realms of science fiction: the airborne-laser (ABL) (see "Directed energy: a new kind of weapon”, 31 July 2002).

This project consumed hundreds of millions of dollars in the late 1990s, and by early in the new century was moving into the testing phase. At its centre was a modified Boeing 747 housing a powerful three-megawatt chemical oxygen-iodine laser with a highly accurate optical system, which could be aimed at missiles soon after their launch. The laser, travelling at the speed of light, had a reported range of up to around 650 kilometres; thus it could patrol outside the airspace of an opponent such as Iran or North Korea. It was calculated that the casing of these missiles, under gravitational stresses as they rapidly accelerated in the boost phase of their flight-path, would be subject to the intense heat of the laser - and thus crumple and collapse.

The system was soon attracting considerable interest. By 2003, the US air force was thinking about the possible use of airborne lasers to hit ground-targets such as barracks, depots or fuel-tankers. Indeed, the very idea of “directed-energy” weapons seemed, for military planners, to amount almost to a perfect weapon. For if, the planners thought, the function of a weapon is to deliver energy to disrupt a target, then ideally it should be very long-range, ultra-fast and impeccably accurate.

Yet even at that stage there were signs that the dream was beginning to turn sour. The entire programme was proving far more difficult to execute and much more costly than anticipated, with too many of the technologies simply too experimental. A couple of successful tests were finally carried out in 2010. But by then support in Congress was slipping; funding was cut at the end of that year, and the whole project was cancelled in late 2011.

That might have been the end of the story: an “ideal” weapon that was just too difficult to develop. But there is a sequel. In mid-April 2013 the US navy announced that a fully operational laser-weapon is to be mounted on a command-ship, the USS Ponce, deployed in the Persian Gulf. Its main purpose is to provide defence against armed drones and small speedboats (see Grace Jean, ”USN to deploy solid-state laser weapon on USS Ponce”, Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 2013).

This laser-weapon system (LaWS) is on a much smaller scale than the airborne laser; it has kilowatt power rather than megawatt, and uses commercially available components. But it is part of a much wider move to develop tactical directed-energy weapons, with this time the US navy at the forefront (see Richard Scott, “Rays of light: can shipborne laser weapons deliver”, Jane's International Defence Review, March 2011).

Moreover, the idea is still very much alive beyond the United States. Israel and China are among other countries getting in on the act, and there is every indication that a number of new directed-energy weapons will be fielded in the coming decade. The airborne laser may have been a technological step too far, but for militaries around the world the overall concept retains great appeal.

The drone link

There is, though, a catch. What works for the military may also work for the paramilitary, especially as the widespread use of quite powerful lasers in industry means that civil laser technologies can readily be modified by sub-state actors.

There is an analogy here with the development of armed-drones. In this area the United States and Israel are in the lead, several years ahead of western European countries as well as Russia and China. But others, including Iran, are following suit (Israel said on 25 April 2013 that it had shot down yet another drone, launched from southern Lebanon - presumably by Iran's ally Hizbollah). So too, with directed-energy weapons. For now, the United States and Israel are in the front rank; but within a few years there will be a proliferation, first to middle-ranking powers and then to non-state actors (see "An asymmetrical drone war", 19 August 2010).

What links armed-drones and directed-energy weapons is that neither is subject to any kind of international arms-control process. Nor is one envisaged. Once again, the armourers are way ahead of the arms controllers. That will almost certainly remain the case, which reinforces the significant of the USS Ponce's deployment. Almost without noticing it, the world is creeping into yet another era of warfare. The outcomes of this new era are unpredictable, though one thing is almost certain: it will involve proliferation to multiple actors - both states and paramilitaries alike.

Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international-security editor, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His books include Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century(Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on twitter at: @ProfPRogers

This article first appeared on openDemocracy 2 May 2013.

Het harde machtsspel tussen de grootmachten rond Syrië

     

Het meedogenloze optreden tegen opstandelingen en gewapende rebellen in Syrië heeft naar schatting tweeduizend mensen het leven gekost, waaronder militairen en politiepersoneel. Vorige week eisten de Amerikaanse president Barack Obama en Europese leiders in koor het vertrek van de Syrische president Bashar al-Assad. Tegelijk riepen de Westerse leiders op tot een VN onderzoek naar misdaden tegen de menselijkheid van het Syrische regime, wat kan leiden tot een verwijzing naar het Internationale Strafhof. De beschuldigingen van de Amerikaanse president tegen zijn Syrische collega zijn hypocriet. [1] Obama en de politieke elite in Washington zijn verantwoordelijk voor misdaden welke die van Assad in de schaduw stellen: “opsluiten, martelen en afslachten” zijn gemeengoed in het imperialistische optreden van de VS in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Irak en Libië, Guantánamo Bay en CIA black holes. De misdaden van Assad tegen zijn eigen bevolking zijn voor Washington vooral een voorwendsel om een Westers gezind nieuw regime aan de macht te brengen.

De ingrijpende hervormingen die het Syrische regime heeft aangekondigd krijgen geen kans door het optreden van gewapende rebellen die de onrust levend houden. De Westerse betrokkenheid bij de onrust, met name die van Saudi Arabië, Israel en Turkije, is evident, maar wordt verzwegen. [2] De terugkeer enkele jaren geleden van de Russen in Syrië komt in de Westerse media evenmin aan bod. [3] Na de Israëlische steun aan Georgië in 2008 heeft Rusland de samenwerking met Syrië nieuw leven ingeblazen. Dat werd mei 2010 beklonken tijdens het bezoek van een Russische delegatie onder leiding van president Dmitry Medvedev. In het Midden-Oosten was de spanning opgelopen nadat de VS en Israel Syrië hadden beschuldigd raketten te hebben geleverd aan het Libanese militante Hezbollah. De Syrische Rusland-expert Taha Abdul Wahad meende dat het bezoek de spanningen in de regio kon doen afnemen. “De terugkeer van Rusland is goed voor het Midden-Oosten, en zal enig besef van een machtsevenwicht kunnen herstellen”, aldus Wahad.

Rusland zegde Syrië omvangrijke wapenleveringen toe en mocht een marinebasis uitbouwen in de Syrische haven Tartus. [4] De Israëlische buitenlandminister Avigdor Lieberman liet weten dat “[de] wapenverkopen niet bijdragen aan een vredesstemming.” Een onzinnig standpunt: Israel besteedt jaarlijks meer dan $15 miljard aan wapentuig, Syrië “slechts” $6 miljard. Maar de wapendeal is wel de kroon op veel bredere betrekkingen tussen de beide landen, waaronder een rechtstreekse vrachtlijn tussen Latakia en Novorossiysk, intensievere olie-exploratie door Gazprom en samenwerking op het gebied van kernenergie. In het voetspoor van zijn vader slaagde ook Assad Jr. er in de grootmachten tegen elkaar uit te spelen. Maar vandaag is voor de VS dat spel uit. Washington zag in dat zijn Syrië-politiek had gefaald. Het was er niet in geslaagd een wig te drijven tussen Syrië en Hamas, Hezbollah en Iran, spelers die bevoorrecht bondgenoot Israel als bedreigend ervaart. In de “Arabische lente” zag de VS zijn kans schoon om het roer in Syrië om te gooien en niet alleen de as Syrië-Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran te doorbreken, maar ook bondgenoot Rusland uit Syrië te verdrijven.

De Indiase diplomaat M. K. Bhadrakumar wijst [5] op de druk van de VS op Rusland om bondgenoot Syrië te laten vallen. In het kader van de vlootoefening Sea Breeze 2011 [6] met Oekraïne als gastland liet de VS de USS Monterrey opstomen naar de Zwarte Zee. Volgens Bhadrakumar kan het Kremlin de inzet van dit hoogtechnologische oorlogsschip alleen maar als provocatie opvatten, als stap in de bouw van het Europese raketschild. Moskou volgt dat project sinds de Rusland-NAVO top van vorig jaar met groeiend wantrouwen. [7] [8] [9] Bhadrakumar denkt dat de Amerikaanse stap is bedoeld om de druk op de Russische Zwarte Zee vloot op te voeren. Rusland verzet zich hardnekkig tegen Amerikaanse pogingen om steun te verwerven voor een militaire interventie in Syrië. In de visie van Bhadrakumar meent Moskou dat het Amerikaanse streven naar regimewissel vooral is gericht op het opdoeken van de Russische marinebasis. Nu Amerika beschikt over militaire bases in Roemenië lijkt met de komst van een Amerikaans oorlogsschip in de Zwarte Zee de omsingeling compleet. Een kat en muis spel waarin de VS de overhand lijkt te halen.

Door te verhinderen dat Syrië op de internationale podia ter verantwoording wordt geroepen riskeert Rusland te worden afgeschilderd als dwarsligger in het Syrische democratiseringsproces. Het dilemma voor Moskou is dat het zijn rol in de Amerikaanse politieke agenda voor Syrië niet kan verklaren. Elke uitleg onthult de onoprechtheid van de VS-Rusland reset waar president Dmitry Medvedev zo zijn nek voor heeft uitgestoken. Bhadrakumar meent dat een nieuw - op het Westen georiënteerd - regime in Damascus de Russische marinebasis zal sluiten. Met zo’n nieuw regime kan tevens Hezbollah worden afgeserveerd, het bondgenootschap met Iran verbroken, de Hamas-top uit Damascus verdreven en een nieuwe stap in het Israel-Palestina “vredesproces” gezet - op Israëlische voorwaarden. De hardere houding van Turkije, dat de Bosporus [10] controleert, versterkt de Amerikaanse hand. Ankara denkt zijn belangen te kunnen dienen door terug te vallen op zijn positie als prominent lid van de NAVO en bijzondere partner van de VS. Het deelt de zorgen van Saudi Arabië over de opkomende regionale grootmacht Iran en ziet in de ontwikkeling kansen om zijn regionale machtsbasis uit te bouwen.

Maar Moskou geeft zich niet zo gemakkelijk gewonnen. Het probeert met Beijing een gezamenlijk standpunt over Syrië in te nemen. Het optreden van Washington zal zijn invloed op de VS-Rusland reset zeker niet missen. En Rusland haalt de banden met Iran aan. Het stuurde vorige week Nikolai Patrushev, secretaris van de presidentiële Veiligheidsraad, naar Teheran voor overleg over hervatting van de internationale gesprekken over het Iraanse kernprogramma, wat op de Israëlische online nieuwssite ynetnews.com breed werd uitgemeten. [11] En eveneens vorige week reisde de Iraanse buitenlandminister Ali Akbar Salehi naar Moskou om “een groot aantal gevoelige onderwerpen te bespreken met Russische bewindslieden.” [12] De toenemende onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen Iran en Rusland is voor de VS zeker iets om over na te denken. Assad heeft vrije verkiezingen in het vooruitzicht gesteld voor februari 2012. Of hij onder Westerse druk voordien van het toneel verdwijnt blijft de vraag. Maar of daarmee Rusland in Syrië bakzeil haalt - waar Bhadrakumar op speculeert - lijkt weinig aannemelijk.

Hoe een Syrië na Assad eruit ziet blijft onzeker, net als de vraag of Washington daarmee zijn weinig rooskleurige positie in het Midden-Oosten versterkt. Na acht jaar Amerikaans optreden in Irak meldde de door de VS aangestelde Iraakse premier Nouri al-Maliki over het gewelddadige optreden van de Syrische regering slechts dat hij hoopte “dat [de] demonstraties niet met geweld worden neergeslagen,” en Assad “snel hervormingen [moet] doorvoeren.” [13] De zachtaardige verklaring van Maliki, wiens Sjiietische moslimpartij nauwe banden heeft met het Sjiietische regime in Iran, moet pijnlijk zijn voor de VS. Scott Lucas, professor in Amerikaanse studies aan de universiteit van Birmingham (VK), meent dat Irak, dat een voorbeeldfunctie zou moeten vervullen van de Amerikaanse macht in de regio, in werkelijkheid de grenzen van die macht toon. “Een aaneenrijging van mislukkingen, Obama zit opgesloten in dezelfde logica als Bush,” aldus Lucas. Alles duidt erop dat de strijd om de macht in het Midden-Oosten - met of zonder is Bashar al-Assad in Syrië - nog niet is gestreden.

[1] Niall Green: “US, European powers demand resignation of Syria’s Assad”

[2] Sahand Avedis: “Lebanon intercepts covert arms shipments bound for Syria”

[3] International Business Times: “Russian President Medvedev visits Syria”

[4] James Denselow: “Russia shows US how to deal with Syria”

[5] M. K. Bhadrakumar: “Syria on the boil, US warship in Black Sea”

[6] Partnership for Peace Information Management System (PIMS): “Sea Breeze 2011 Exercise”

[7] Geopolitiek in perspectief: “De betekenis van de NAVO-top in Lissabon Deel 1”

[8] Ibid: “De betekenis van de NAVO-top in Lissabon Deel 2”

[9] Ibid: “NAVO 3.0 en de machtsverhoudingen in de wereld”

[10] Wikipedia: “Bosporus”

[11] Ynetnews.com: “Iran's 'nuclear partner' Russia seeks to revive global talks”

[12] Kaveh L Afrasiabi: “Tehran and Moscow cheek by jowl

[13] Flavia Krause-Jackson en Caroline Alexander: “Iraq’s‘Soft Line’ on Syria Snubs Obama Policy in Nod to Iran

Hoe het Westen de "Arabische lente" laat doodbloeden

    

“De VS en zijn bondgenoten zullen er alles aan doen om echte democratie in de Arabische wereld te verhinderen.” Dat zei de befaamde Amerikaanse politiek activist Noam Chomsky [1] [2] onlangs op een bijeenkomst in New York ter gelegenheid van het 25-jarig bestaan van Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR), [3] [4] de Amerikaanse media watcher die regelmatig rapporteert over vooroordelen en censuur in de media. Zie de onderstaande video. Een overgrote meerderheid in de regio ziet de Verenigde Staten als de belangrijkste bedreiging voor hun belangen. De tegenstand tegen het Amerikaanse beleid is zelfs zo groot dat een aanzienlijke meerderheid - in het belangrijke Egypte zelfs 80% - meent dat de regio veiliger is als Iran over kernwapens beschikt. Slechts 10% ziet Iran als een bedreiging. De VS en zijn bondgenoten zien dus niet graag regeringen aantreden die tegemoetkomen aan de wil van de bevolking. Gebeurt dat toch, dan verliest de VS niet alleen de controle over de regio, maar wordt het eruit gegooid. Een onaanvaardbaar resultaat voor het Westen.

De onthullingen van WikiLeaks die het sterkst aan bod kwamen in de media waren die over de Arabische steun aan het Iran-beleid van de VS. Waarmee ons een rad voor ogen wordt gedraaid. Het betrof immers slechts de mening van de Arabische dictators. Over wat er leeft onder de bevolking wordt in de Westerse media vrijwel unaniem gezwegen. De mediabonzen menen dat de bevriende dictators hun bevolking wel onder controle kunnen houden, zodat het business as usual blijft. Arabische olielanden zoals Saudi-Arabië, met een volgzame dictator, mogen dus blijven voortdoen. Ook in Saudi-Arabië waren protesten gepland, maar de ordetroepen waren met een zo grote en intimiderende overmacht verschenen dat geen mens in de hoofdstad Riyadh op straat durfde. In Kuwait gebeurde iets dergelijks. Een kleine demonstratie, die zeer snel uiteen werd geslagen. Allemaal zaken waar wij niets over te horen kregen.

Voor Chomsky is Bahrein de interessantste case. Door Saudische militaire tussenkomst konden de locale ordetroepen de rebellie uiterst hardhandig neerslaan, feiten die nauwelijks de Westerse pers haalden. Het land herbergt de Amerikaanse 5e vloot, is 70% Sjiietisch en grenst aan het olierijke Oost Saudi-Arabië met eveneens een Sjiietische meerderheid. Saudi-Arabië is sinds de jaren 40 ’s werelds belangrijkste energiebron. Door een merkwaardige historische en geografische speling van het lot liggen de belangrijkste energiebronnen van de wereld vooral in Sjiietische regio’s. In het Midden-Oosten zijn de Sjiieten dan wel een minderheid, maar zij zitten wel bovenop de olie, precies rond het noordelijk deel van de Perzische Golf: Oost Saudi-Arabië, Irak en Zuid-West Iran. Beleidsmakers maken zich al lang zorgen over een stilzwijgend bondgenootschap in deze Sjiietische regio’s dat streeft naar onafhankelijkheid en de controle verwerft over de bulk van de oliereserves in de wereld. Een ontwikkeling die het Westen vanzelfsprekend niet kan tolereren.

Hoe gaat het Westen dan om met de rebellie in Arabische landen zonder olie, zo vraagt Chomsky zich af. In Egypte and Tunesië werden de dictators zo lang mogelijk in het zadel gehouden. Toen het tij keerde werden de dictators weggestuurd, mooie verklaringen afgelegd over de passie voor democratie, om er vervolgens alles aan te doen om het oude regime te herstellen, misschien met nieuwe namen. Zo gaat dat voortdurend, waar ook ter wereld. Het werkt niet altijd, maar wordt altijd geprobeerd. Denk aan Somoza in Nicaragua, de Shah in Iran, Marcos in de Filippijnen, Duvalier in Haïti, Chun in Zuid-Korea, Mobutu in Congo, Ceausescu in Roemenië, Suharto in Indonesië. En zo gaat het ook in Egypte and Tunesië.

Maar er is ook een andere categorie. Een olieland met een onbetrouwbare dictator, een “dolle hond”: Libië. Daar wordt onder de noemer “humanitaire interventie” naarstig gezocht naar een meegaander dictator. Historische voorbeelden genoeg. Vrijwel elke ontplooiing van geweld gaat gepaard met de meest edelmoedige retoriek. Het gaat steeds over humanitaire doelen, denk aan de inval van Hitler in Tsjecho-Slowakije, het dolzinnige optreden van de Japanse fascisten in Noord-Oost China, Mussolini in Ethiopië. Kom met een goed verhaal en de media slikken het wel. Of, zoals in het geval van Libië, plaats de interventie tegen de achtergrond van een verzoek van de Arabische Liga.

Maar men moet dan wel zwijgen over het verzoek van de Arabische Liga om een No-Fly Zone voor Gaza in te stellen. Dat bericht haalde weliswaar de Washington Times, maar werd in de andere Amerikaanse media geblokkeerd, net als de Arabische opiniepeilingen. Zo'n bericht staat immers haaks op het beleid van de VS, dat moet dus terzijde worden gelegd. Sommige berichten halen wel de Amerikaanse pers, maar worden uit hun context gehaald. Zo berichtte de New York Times dat een meerderheid in Egypte het vredesverdrag van 1979 met Israel, “de hoeksteen van de stabiliteit in de regio”, wil opzeggen. Het is de wereld op zijn kop: het verdrag leidde tot instabiliteit. Israel kreeg zijn handen vrij voor zijn illegale acties in de bezette gebieden en de 20.000 mensenlevens kostende aanval op buurland Libanon om daar - tevergeefs - een bevriende regering in het zadel te helpen. Het woord “stabiliteit” betekent hier “zich voegend naar onze belangen”. Als Iran zijn invloed ziet toenemen in Afghanistan en Irak heet dat “destabilisatie”, maar als de VS die landen binnenvalt en bezet, deels vernietigt, dan is dat om “stabiliteit” te verzekeren.

Zij die het hadden over de Egyptische revolutie waren voorbarig [5], wat we vandaag in dat land zien is niets meer of minder dan een militaire junta, samengesteld uit in de VS opgeleide mensen. Men moet dus geen fundamentele veranderingen verwachten in de Arabische wereld, hooguit het aantreden van nieuwe leiders die even schatplichtig zijn aan Westerse belangen als hun voorgangers.

[1] Wikipedia: “Noam Chomsky”

[2] zie CHOMSKY.NL
[3] Wikipedia: “Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting”
[4] zie “What's FAIR?”
[5] Geopolitiek in perspectief: “De als burgerrevolte vermomde militaire staatsgreep in Egypte”

Iran-Transatlantic Relations Need New Software

by Nabi Sonboli

Part 3: Looking forward

Mausoleum Imam Reza

There are many more fields of cooperation between Iran, the EU and the US than areas of differences or competition. Stability and development in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant; contributing to global energy security; security of supply and transit of gas to both the EU and Asian countries; expansion of economic relations and its benefit for EU and US markets; control and containment of terrorism and extremism; preventing drug trafficking, etc., are among the common interest of all sides. It is not understandable why some people, instead of concentrating on so many common interests, are only blowing up minor issues and problems. Even the nuclear issue is not a big problem between the two sides. EU and US participation in the Iranian nuclear program is the best mechanism for confidence building and best objective guarantee for being sure about the nature of the program.

If we compare the Iranian behavior in Iraq and Afghanistan with some of those in the region who are called strategic partner and/or allies by the US and EU countries, the US and NATO have benefited much more from Iranian contributions than others. Appreciating Iranian positive role by constructive behavior and positions is necessary to strengthen mutual confidence.

Those who see their benefit in weakening and even destroying relations between Iran and US-EU need to rethink about that. The more weakened the relations have been, the more they have lost their influence on Iran and the regional developments. Those who push for isolationist policies need to understand who will benefit from such policies. During the past decades, different tendencies have tried to influence Iranian foreign policy: Asianists, Europeanists, Americanists, Isolationists, Globalists, and the supporters of non-alignment are some of them. The shifting focus of Iran’s foreign policy to different directions stems from the existence of different tendencies inside the country. The US and EU pressures have just undermined the position of those who support better relations between Iran and the West. This is why gradually the number of those who are ready to support rapprochement is shrinking.

The US and EU may be able to close their doors, but the key to all doors is not in their hands. Many doors have remained open for Iran. The new generation of businessmen is familiar with Beijing and Shanghai much more than Hamburg and London. The next generation of intellectuals and engineers are more familiar with Indian, Russian and Malaysian universities than French, German and US ones.

Long term pressures and pushes by the US and some European countries have led to less Western influence on Iranian public opinion. The majority of people is neither pro-West, nor anti-West. However, the constant anti-Iran propaganda, blowing up minor issues and creating big problems like sanctions, and launching wars in the region, have led to a loss of credibility of the West among the people. Double standard policies toward democracy and human rights have made these mottos less attractive. The people look for a better life, but none of the foreign countries can claim that they have been supporting a better life for the people. Supporting Saddam during the Iraqi war against Iran, launching the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and imposing sanctions for Iran’s nuclear program that the people support, do not endorse the allegation of wanting a better life for the people in Iran and the region.

Furthermore, gradually a kind of consensus has been created among different political groups on most of foreign policy issues. Stability, solidarity and national unity are the red lines. Iran’s society will not support anyone who crosses them. All political groups oppose a military attack and most of them even oppose any sanction. In addition, the structure of power (put in comprehensive terms) in Iran is pluralistic and different political groups have enough social, political and economic bases to continue their influence on politics. Consequently supporting changes in Iranian politics and/or waiting for them to happen, will not lead to major behavioral changes in foreign and even in internal politics. Hence, we witness more continuity in Iran’s foreign policy than change. This is why neither the wait and see policy nor pro/against positions toward different political groups has led to the expected result.

Additionally, most of the issues that Iran’s foreign policy is involved in are both strategic and international. These features limit Iran’s room to maneuver in its foreign policy. Iran cannot change its positions without witnessing necessary changes in the behavior of others, especially that of the US. However, Iran has not limited its flexibility, like the US and the EU. The latter, by passing different laws and resolutions has bound its hand and limited its options. These self restrictions contribute to self-defeating. The failure of past US sanctions and regulations against Iran shows that this process does not work.

Because of fundamental changes, the old software does not work between Iran and the US and the EU. The interdependence between EU-US has prevented EU-Iran relations from working properly. The experience during the past three decades demonstrates that neither side is unilaterally able to write an appropriate program for a working relationship. To establish mutually beneficial relations, writing a common and effective program is necessary.

Nabi Sonboli holds an M.A.in international relations. He is a Research Fellow at the International and Legal Studies section of the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran and is currently representing the institute in Berlin working on scientific cooperation.
    

Iran-Transatlantic Relations Need New Software

by Nabi Sonboli

Part 2: Geopolitical aspects

Bridge of Culture, Isfahan

Geographically, Iran is a big country with more than 70 million young population, vast gas and oil resources, located among four major sub-regions: the Persian Gulf, AfPak, the Caspian Region and the Middle East. Iran’s relations with most of its neighbors have been stable during the past two centuries and although Saddam made a big mistake in attacking Iran, Iran-Arab relations also have been satisfactory for a long time. The influence of the Arabic culture and language on Iran and the Persian language cannot be ignored. Because of common history, religious connections and geographical proximity, a separation of Iranians and Arabs on both side of the Persian Gulf is not possible. Social communication is increasing. Every year more than one million people from Iran and Arab countries visit religious places in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Economically, without the Iranian market there will be no UAE as an important international transit economy. The economy of land locked areas in central Asia and Afghanistan will develop much better by connecting them to the Iranian economy, and the Persian Gulf and Turkey through Iran.

Iran’s strategic location plus historical and cultural connections with its neighborhood have contributed to its influence in the region. Iran’s social, economic, technological, and scientific developments in comparison to its surrounding also support the sustainability of the system and its resistance against foreign pressures. All these factors have led to the failure of sanctions and efforts to isolate Tehran. Pressures against Iran have just thickened the wall of mistrust between the two sides.

While the US and the EU have gradually increased the pressure on Iran, they have benefited from Iran’s policies on many important occasions, for example Iran’s opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its support of the Afghan resistance movements that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War; opposition to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and supporting freedom of Kuwait; the condemnation of the 9/11 attacks; the support of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban; the active participation in state-building and reconstruction of Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era; the active participation in Iraq’s reconstruction and supporting peace, stability and development there, ….

While Iran has been following such positive roles from which the transatlantic countries have benefited, some of their regional allies have played a negative role and have increased the US and the EU burdens especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the US has condemned Iran and the Bush administration wrongly called Iran as part of “Axis of Evil”.

Summarizing, geographically, economically, politically and culturally, Iran is located at the center of four strategic regions and sub-regions: the Caucasus, Central Asia, AfPak, and the Persian Gulf. During the past three decades and even more, the transatlantic countries have not been able to play a leading role in these regions and solve the problems. During the next two decades the situation will not change to their benefit. Neglecting Iran’s role, the unilateral interventions by the transatlantic countries also have only exacerbated the security situation there and increased their burden.

Bringing peace, stability and development to these regions is among the common vital interest of Iran and the West, (especially the EU, because of its geographic proximity).Those who are not familiar with the realities in the region talk about isolation and sanctions against Iran, but those who are familiar with the realities know very well that Iran is the axis of stability among many instable regions and its isolation is neither possible nor productive.

Nabi Sonboli holds an M.A.in international relations. He is a Research Fellow at the International and Legal Studies section of the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran and is currently representing the institute in Berlin working on scientific cooperation.
   

Iran-Transatlantic Relations Need New Software

by Nabi Sonboli

Part 1: Past experiences and current realities

Foreign policy is a constellation of applicable ideas and behaviors raised and done by a political system. To understand the foreign policy of a country we need to know the real behaviors on the ground and the applicable ideas with enough support in the political system. Reading the news, especially those that may be distorted or targeted to specific audiences, does not contribute to understanding a country’s foreign policy. When a politician or researcher thinks about the foreign policy of his/her country (s), he takes into account at least two important factors: past experiences and current realities (both internal and external). Although, past experiences between Iran, the US and some influential European countries like UK are not promising, current realities require all sides to learn from the past and think about the future.

During the past two centuries, the number of negative experiences in Iran and its neighborhoods influencing Tehran’s threat perception, have been much higher than the positive ones. From early the 19th till early 21st century, we have witnessed the occupation of the northern part of Iran by Russia in early 19th and the 20th century and by the Soviet Union during the second world war; the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in early 20th century; the invasion of all regional countries from North Africa to Afghanistan by France, the UK, the US, etc. We experienced the long extended intervention of Russia, the UK and the US in Iranian internal politics; the military coup against democratically elected prime minister Mosadeq by US-UK; the support of the Shah dictatorship by western countries; regional and international support for the Iraqi war against Iran; the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and its allies; and three decades of unilateral and multilateral economic, military and technological sanctions; …. There is a long list of negative experiences that influence threat perception of Iranians with any political inclination.

To compare these with positive actions during the same period of time, we can find few cases that the US and main European counties have provided support for Iran. Europe’s limited support of the constitutional revolution in Iran in early 20th century; Germany’s support of Iranian resistance forces against the British occupation of the southern part of Iran; the US ultimatum to the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran after the second world war, are among the few positive actions contributed to Iranian national security and desires. Despite the incomparable weight of negative to positive behaviors, the image of the West and even the US in Iran has not been so negative. Forgiveness and forgetting as some Iranian cultural characteristics have led them mostly to be optimistic and to think about the future. However, these historical experiences have contributed to a lack of confidence toward the West in general, and the US and the UK in particular. As transatlantic cooperation against Iran increases, the negative image and mistrust that were limited to a few countries in the past expands to include all.

The second factor influencing the decisions is current realities. Iran’s regional policy is based on regional realities surrounding the country and imposed on the region. During the past three decades we have been living in one of the most unstable and war-ridden regions in the world. The Iraqi war against Iran (1980-88), the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the subsequent clashes between the US, the UK and Iraq, followed by the invasion of Iraq by the US and its allies (1990-still continues), the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the civil war in Afghanistan (1989-2002), the invasion of Afghanistan (2002- still continues), the war between Russia and Georgia (2008) etc. We have not witnessed any year without war or crises for three decades in the Iranian neighborhood. The background of all these instabilities and wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Caucasian region and the Middle East shows clearly that Iran has had no role in creating them. These instabilities have been the main obstacle toward regional economic, social and political development, and the root cause of the current problems. Iran has not benefited and will not benefit from these instabilities in its surroundings.

Naturally these wars and instabilities influence the threat perception of any nation living there and Iran is not an exception. This situation has shaped two elements of Iran’s grand strategy: independence and resistance. Iran’s efforts to achieve autarky and independence in different economic and technological fields including nuclear energy, nanotechnology, biotech, airspace, etc., have been evident during the past decades. Following such a policy with limited resources is difficult and costly, but the lack of confidence toward the US, the UK etc., and living in an insecure region have encouraged Iran to diversify its foreign relations and increase its independence in vital areas. Resistance has been the second element in Iran’s foreign policy, influenced by its historical experience. Resistance is a defensive policy, not an ambitious or offensive one. It has both historical and cultural backgrounds in Iran’s and Shiite history and geographical basis.

Culturally, Iran’s national and political culture has received more influence from mysticism as a peaceful worldview. The influence of mysticism on the works of almost all important writers, which have had deep impact on Iran’s culture, is visible. Shahnameh as the most important text for all nationalist and pan-Iranist groups is a clear example. It mixes nationalism and heroism with mysticism and rationality. Another reason for defensiveness of nationalistic tendencies is that Iran has always been a big country, and foreign domination or national disintegration has been the main concern. Shiite culture as minority culture among Sonny majority in Muslim word is defensive. In addition the influence of mysticism on Shiite history and political culture in Iran is also well known. Although Shiite have had a long history in Iran, but during the Safavid period it was announced as the official religion. The term Safavi means Sufis that is based on mysticism. The Safavid dynasty expanded Shiite as a defensive identity policy against the expansionist policies of the Ottoman Empire. This is why rarely we find expansionist ideas even among Shiites.

Furthermore, Iran - both as a multiethnic society and as a majority Shiite and Arian in a multiethnic and multi-religion context including Arabs, Turks and Sonnies, Christians and Jews - knows its own limitations in following any ambitious and expansionist policy. This is why historically Iran has tried to have good relations with all its neighbors, especially the minorities. Supporting different Shiite, Sonny and even Christian groups in the region, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Lebanon, stems from such an understanding. The existence of different minorities in Iran has also created a bridge between Iran and other countries in the region. This is why Iran has been able to play as an axis of stability. The official borders are not the real borders and any external instability has internal consequences for Iran. Immigration of millions of people from Afghanistan, Iraq and Azerbaijan during internal and external wars in these countries is a clear example.

Nabi Sonboli holds an M.A.in international relations. He is a Research Fellow at the International and Legal Studies section of the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran and is currently representing the institute in Berlin working on scientific cooperation.