Iran, domestic tension and foreign policy

by Omid Memarian

Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader of Iran.

Photo: Foundation of Holy Defence Values, Archives and Publications - Wikimedia Commons

The prospect of a military attack on Iran to disable the country's nuclear facilities is being intensively considered in Tehran. But the internal tensions between rival factions - especially supporters of the supreme leader and of the president - are an obstacle to a coherent response, says Omid Memarian.

The first months of 2012 have been dominated by analysis and speculation over a possible attack on Iran over its nuclear plans. In this delicate situation, understanding the calculations of the authorities in Iran is clearly vital. So what is happening in Iran, and how is the combination of internal political developments and external pressures on the government in Tehran - such as tripling sanctions and the threat of war - being played out?

A place to start in answering these questions is the comment by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 8 March 2012 which responded favourably to President Barack Obama's statement that he was not considering war with Iran. Khamenei, speaking to members of the Assembly of Experts (one of Iran's leading constitutional bodies), said: "This talk is good talk, and is indicative that [Obama] is outside of the illusion. But the president of America continued to say that we want to bring the Iranian people to their knees with the sanctions. This part of his talk is indicative that the illusion continues in this respect... Continuing this illusion will hurt American officials and their calculations will fail."

The comment had been preceded by the parliamentary elections in Iran on 2 March which gave a solid majority to the circle around the supreme leader. This outcome raises the question of how current power-struggles within the Iranian elite are likely to affect Iran's foreign-policy course, particularly over its ambitious and costly nuclear programme.

The power-struggle

Ayatollah Khamenei is ultimately in charge of Iran's major foreign-policy decisions, including the nuclear programme. Yet internal factional conflicts, broadly between conservatives and reformists (often perceived as the two wings of Iran's political system - with the supreme leader the central figure in the former camp) can strongly affect the pace of decision-making. Until recently, the balancing factor of inter-party struggles provided Khamenei with political cover. But Khamenei, with his supporting base in major political institutions, has gradually managed - both in the turbulent aftermath of the presidential election in 2009, and again in the 2012 parliamentary elections - to remove reformist forces from Iran's political scene.

Now, conservatives rule almost all major civil and military institutions and the supreme leader has established a commanding role in managing the country's major policies. Thus, any damaging rift between pro-leader conservatives would now put Khamenei in the spotlight, damage his authority, and make him vulnerable to blame for any wrongdoing by his supporters.

Khamenei's awareness of this, and his desire to deflect responsibility for failures and unpopular policies, mean that he tries consistently to present all decision-making (even when carried out with his direct orders or in consultation with him) as a product of collective thinking by his subordinates.

Khamenei enjoys the complete support of the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and is ultimately in charge of all the country's powerful military and intelligence organisations. He has avoided implementing policies that could accelerate the existing rift among the conservatives. This will have an impact on the actions of the newly elected parliament and on the ongoing crackdown on Iran's internal critics and dissidents.

This crackdown has seen many journalists, filmmakers, bloggers, civil-society activists, and workers who attempt to demand their labour rights face the state's iron fist, and are routinely charged with offenses such as "acting against national security" or "presenting a dark portrayal of the state." In addition most reformist leaders, including the opposition presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are either in prison or under house-arrest. Many prominent reformists, such as former president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, face serious limitations on their political activities. There are restrictions on journalists' reporting of their predicament or news related to them.

The reformists played no part in Iran’s parliamentary elections. In part as a result, Khamenei has been able to shape the most homogenous ruling group in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet a side-effect of this outcome is that failures and shortcomings in the country's policies can no longer be blamed on reformists, who were in charge for eight years before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in June 2005, and not even on those conservatives who have distanced themselves with the leader.

In this sense, Iran's supreme leader is now in a more vulnerable position than it would appear. Even in the new parliament, again comprised of a conservative majority loyal to Khamenei and critical of Ahmadinejad, support for him is not absolutely assured. Two major conservative groups won more than half of the seats - the Islamic Revolution Stability Front and the United Principalists Front - but the true affiliations of more than 100 new MP's are unclear. Some analysts believe that a large proportion of these could be backed by Iran's vice-president Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is scorned by supporters of the supreme leader. In addition, a small group of the newly elected - which includes Ali Motahari and Ahmad Tavakoli - are staunch critics of the government. But since the nominees (under velayat-e faqih, the rule of the jurist), it is almost impossible to find out whose vow of loyalty is real and authentic until they start their work in the parliament.

The political timetable

There are fifteen months to go before Iran's next presidential election in June 2013. Until then a powerful, critical parliament will be able to limit the activities of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - perhaps even impeach him after an investigation into his financial affairs. Just days after the parliamentary elections, the president was questioned before the current MPs. In the style of his seven years in office, his provocative performance was matched by angry reactions from some MPs. Some of them now talk of impeaching Ahmadinejad for his incompetent performance, something that in principle will be easier to pursue in the new parliament.

For his part, Ayatollah Khamenei will seek to prevent the incumbent president from using funds and influence over the next two years to choose a potential successor from among his own friends and affiliates. Khamenei will want to promote his own favourite, possibly Gholamali Haddad Adel, the current deputy speaker of parliament and a close relative of the supreme leader.

The embattled Ahmadinejad thus faces a struggle to survive even until the end of his term in office. But as head of government he still holds two powerful cards: Iran's booming oil revenues (partly as a result of the threats of attack) and access to the intelligence ministry. He has insinuated several times that he has information potentially damaging to the supreme-leader's supporters, which he could reveal if necessary. So Ahmadinejad could retaliate in kind if (for example) he is accused of corruption or if he or his inner circle are put under extreme pressure.

The probability of continued tension between president and supreme leader - where (for example) the president seeks to obstruct any major political decisions taken by the supreme leader or groups under his oversight, especially in areas such as Iran's nuclear programme or its foreign policy - is a recipe for paralysis until the end of Ahmadinejad's term. The implication is that even if the west opens the way to negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme, the chances of a successful result that meets the west's concerns are minimal.

The only way out of a political standoff of this kind could be a sweeping crisis in which military groups, particularly the IRGC, practically take control over the country and marginalise the president. That scenario may be why some groups within the Iranian leadership and the IRGC might even welcome any short-lived military attack as a pretext to cement their power inside Iran's ruling elite.

Iran, after all, has long experience of internal forces using foreign policy as a tactic to gain more political power. The case of a military attack by the US or Israel (or both) on Iran's nuclear or military facilities - or even accelerated verbal threats to this effect - would be convenient for those seeking to impose a state of emergency in the country that enabled the IRGC, under the oversight of the supreme leader, to replace Iran’s civilian politicians and take control of all state affairs.

Most signals of war from the west suggest that any military attack on Iran would be limited, intended to disable Iran's nuclear facilities and postpone the country's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whether any assault succeeded in this, Iran's more extreme factions could use it to concentrate power in their hands, to suppress dissidents even further, and to reach out to public opinion in the region. It is at least certain that they would be strengthened by an attack.

There are very few options that could today lead to a sudden change in Iran's foreign policy. One is for Ahmadinejad to present the supreme leader with a fait accompli regarding important decisions, such as over Iran's nuclear activities (in 2009 the president acted in this way by dismissing the intelligence minister that Khamenei had handpicked). Another is for Khamenei to reduce the president's authority and delegate fundamental decisions to committees under his control.

This rooted internal tension means that substantial changes in the balance of political forces are unlikely before the presidential election of 2013. But the pattern could alter if Iran's leadership becomes convinced that intensified economic sanctions or military action could lead to irreparable damage to the Islamic Republic's political life.

Iranian leaders know that extreme conditions could challenge the state's rule at its very heart. The defence of the state is the red line that Ayatollah Khomeini and now Ayatollah Khamenei have observed since the Islamic Republic’s inception in 1979. In this sense the west's policies towards Iran in the coming months could be more influential over Iran's foreign policy than internal developments.

Omid Memarian is a journalist who writes for the IPS (Inter Press Service) news agency and the Daily Beast, and whose work has been published in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the San Francisco Chronicle. In 2005, he received both Human Rights Watch's Human Rights Defender award and the Hellmen Hemet award. In 2007-09, he was a World Peace Fellow at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism. He is currently working on a multimedia project on the condition of "American Muslims in the Obama Era", and teaches journalism at the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR). His website is here.

This article first appeared on Open Democracy, 19 March 2012

De Israëlische oorlogsretoriek tegen Iran: dekmantel voor de sluipende annexatie van Palestina?

    

President Barack Obama talks on the phone with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel in the Oval Office, Jan. 12, 2012.

(Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Een Israëlische aanval op Iran dit jaar is weinig waarschijnlijk. Alleen de VS kan een serieuze militaire operatie uitvoeren, maar is dat voorlopig niet van plan. Israel’s angst voor Iraanse kernwapens lijkt weinig reëel. Voor Israel is het Iran-“probleem” van ondergeschikt belang in vergelijking met de uitbouw van nederzettingen in Palestijns gebied, en uiteindelijk Groot-Israel tussen Nijl en Eufraat.

De recente ontmoeting tussen de Israëlische premier Benjamin Netanyahu en de Amerikaanse president Barack Obama in Washington had als doel de violen te stemmen over het nucleaire programma van Iran. Israel stelt dat Iran op korte termijn een zone of immunity bereikt. Dat begrip werd vorig jaar geïntroduceerd door Ehud Barak, de Israëlische minister van Defensie. Die zegt dat de vraag niet is hoe en wanneer Iran hoogverrijkt uranium produceert en daarmee een kernwapen ontwikkelt, maar waar. Iran is volop bezig met de verplaatsing van de productie van 20% verrijkt uranium van Natanz naar Fordo, [1] een zwaar versterkte ondergrondse installatie, die immuun wordt voor de conventionele bommen van Israel, zeker nu Iran de toegangstunnels en ventilatiesystemen verder versterkt.

Semi-verrijkt uranium is een belangrijke stap op weg naar hoogverrijkt uranium van wapenkwaliteit. Iran is vandaag dus al nuclear capable. Daarmee is in principe elke discussie over rode lijnen die Iran niet zou mogen overschrijden achterhaald. Iran benadrukt dat zijn nucleaire ambities volledig vreedzaam zijn, maar Israel hecht daar geen geloof aan. Israel kan dan misschien een luchtaanval op de nucleaire installaties van Iran overwegen, maar vandaag kan alleen de VS een serieuze militaire operatie uitvoeren. De Amerikaanse president heeft echter laten weten daar voorlopig niet aan te denken. Een Israëlische aanval kan - nog afgezien van het feit dat die niet onbeantwoord zal blijven - averechts uitwerken en leiden tot een Iraanse politieke beslissing om in hoog tempo zijn nuclear capability te verwezenlijken. Onder deze omstandigheden lijkt een Israëlische aanval op Iran dit jaar weinig waarschijnlijk, [2] maar Netanyahu kreeg van Obama wel de verzekering dat de VS militair ingrijpt als de Iraanse dreiging concreet wordt en alle andere opties falen.

Hoe reëel is de angst van Israel over kernwapens in Iran? Kernwapens zijn enkel dienstig als afschrikking. Een nucleair Iran betekent geen existentiële bedreiging voor Israel. [3] Kernmogendheden beschikken wel over meer politieke macht. Israel, dat zelf over een indrukwekkend kernarsenaal beschikt, wenst zijn machtsmonopolie in het Midden-Oosten te behouden. Het heeft met de dreigementen om desnoods eenzijdig aan te vallen de zwaarst denkbare internationale sancties op regionale grootmacht en rivaal Iran kunnen afdwingen. Ter rechter zijde in de coalitieregering van Netanyahu is men niet happig op een militair optreden. [4] Daar beschouwt men het Iran-“probleem” van ondergeschikt belang in vergelijking met het verder uitbouwen van nederzettingen in bezet Palestijns gebied, en droomt men van een Groot-Israel tussen Nijl en Eufraat. Na 40 jaar kolonisatie mag dat project niet worden doorkruist door een aanval op Iran. Maar de rechtervleugel is zich ook bewust van het afleidingseffect van de kwestie Iran. De sluipende annexatie van Palestijns gebied moet uit de media blijven. Met Iran op de agenda kan Israel zich aansluiten bij het bezorgde Westen en kritiek over het Israel-Palestina conflict ontlopen. Hoezeer deze afleidingsstrategie dienstig is voor de Groot-Israel zaak blijkt wel uit Obama’s interview in The Atlantic, [5] dat geen woord wijdt aan de Palestijnen of de nederzettingen.

Om het Iran-dossier op de politieke agenda te houden schrikt Israel ook niet terug voor een rondje geweld op Gaza. De meedogenloze luchtraids op de Gazastrook van het vorig weekend waren puur uitgelokt. [6] Het geweld begon met de executies door Israel van Zuhair Al-Qaisi en Mahmoud Al-Hannani van de Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), volgens Israel de "meesterbreinen" achter een aanval bij Eilat vorig jaar. Deze bewering is aantoonbaar onjuist, een feit dat Israel vreemd genoeg eerder al heeft toegegeven. [7] Het Israëlische geweld volgt een typisch patroon: Israel pleegt een dodelijke aanslag in de wetenschap dat het Palestijns verzet met een antwoord komt. Vervolgens gebruikt het dat antwoord - tientallen geïmproviseerde raketten op Israel die zelden doel treffen - als voorwendsel voor aanhoudende bombardementen. De Palestijnse raketten geven Israel niet alleen de kans om het beeld van een mogelijke Iraanse rakettenregen op te roepen, maar ook een prima gelegenheid om zijn “Iron Dome” antiraketsysteem uit te testen. Israel verklaarde het afgelopen weekend zo tientallen Palestijnse raketten te hebben kunnen onderschappen.

Israëlische bronnen bevestigen dat deze acties dienen om de oorlogsdreiging aan het adres van Iran verder te laten escaleren en Hamas te verleiden opnieuw geweld te gebruiken. Israel voert dus doelbewust buitengerechtelijke executies uit, oorlogsmisdaden, om vergelding uit te lokken dat het leven kost van tientallen Palestijnen, actieve leden van het verzet, maar ook omstanders. Het Israëlisch beleid om op basis van flinterdunne beschuldigingen Palestijnen in bezet gebied zonder aanklacht of proces uit te schakelen is een grove schending van het internationaal humanitair recht. Zelfs in China, Iran en de VS, landen waar de doodstraf geldt en ontegenzeggelijk ook onschuldigen ter dood worden gebracht, krijgen verdachten een proces. Israel echter brengt de laatste tien jaar in het geheim zonder enige vorm van proces honderden Palestijnen om het leven door aanslagen op huizen of voertuigen, samen met honderden omstanders. Een beleid dat de regering-Obama tegenwoordig ook volgt, zelfs als het gaat om Amerikaanse burgers, het zoveelste staaltje van de gedeelde waarden van de Amerikaanse en Israëlische leiders.

Tegengehouden door Washington met betrekking tot Iran, is de kans levensgroot dat Netanyahu's rechtse coalitie, gekweld door verdeeldheid, corruptieschandalen en toenemende binnenlandse maatschappelijke onvrede, de provocatie tegen het Palestijnse volk zal opvoeren. [8] De Israëlische heersende elite gebruikt traditioneel oorlog als middel om af te rekenen met interne dissidentie. De afgelopen zomer werd gekenmerkt door de grootste demonstraties ooit. De betogingen waren gericht tegen de sociale ongelijkheid, een eis waar de Israëlische overheid nog weinig aan heeft gedaan en ongetwijfeld binnenkort in volle hevigheid terugkomt. Volgens het Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF) stagneren de reële lonen in Israel al meer dan tien jaar. Israel kent meer armoede dan andere leden van de Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO), waartoe het land in 2010 toetrad.

Hoezeer de VS met twee maten meet blijkt nog eens uit de toespraak van Buitenlandminister Hillary Clinton in de Veiligheidsraad op 12 maart. [9] Over Syrië was het niets dan hypocrisie: “moord met voorbedachten rade door het militaire apparaat van een overheid is wat anders dan zelfverdediging van burgers die onder vuur liggen.” Daarmee legitimeert Clinton gewapend verzet van Syrische burgers tegen hun overheid, sterker nog, voor haar is dat verzet moreel superieur. En over Gaza, dat bijna een week lang onder onuitgelokte Israëlische bombardementen heeft gelegen zei ze: “Ik veroordeel met klem de raketaanvallen van Gaza op Zuid-Israel. Ik roep de verantwoordelijken op om die onmiddellijk te stoppen. Beide partijen moeten de rust herstellen.” Geen woord van medeleven met de families van de omgekomen Palestijnen, geen woord over de aanstichter van de vijandigheden. Een Amerikaanse houding die weinig goeds voorspelt over de afloop van het Israel-Palestina conflict.

[1] Wikipedia: “Nuclear facilities in Iran”
[2] IISS Voices: “Israeli attack on Iran ‘unlikely’ this year”
[3] Geopolitiek in perspectief: “Betekent een nucleair Iran een existentiële bedreiging voor Israel?”
[4] Daniel Levy: “Netanyahu Won't Attack Iran (Probably.)”
[5] Jeffrey Goldberg: “Obama to Iran and Israel: 'As President of the United States, I Don't Bluff'”
[6] Ali Abunimah: “"Mowing the lawn": On Israel’s latest massacre in Gaza and the lies behind it”
[7] Max Blumenthal: “Israel's bogus case for bombing Gaza obscures political motives”
[8] Jean Shaoul: “Israel expands deadly air strikes on Gaza”
[9] US Department of State: “Remarks [of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton] at the United Nations Security Council”

Media May Give Hamas Extreme Makeover

by Ira Chernus

Supporters wave Hamas flags to welcome released prisoners in Ramallah, West Bank, December 18, 2011.

(Photo: Rina Castelnuovo / The New York Times)

Hamas may be headed for an extreme makeover in the corporate mass media. Yes, Hamas, the "terrorist" Palestinian party supposedly sworn to the destruction of Israel. At least, that's what you'd believe if you get all your news from America's mass media, where virtually every article about Hamas has included that ominous description as if it were indisputable fact.

To keep up the fiction, real facts had to be ignored, of course. For years, Hamas has been offering Israel a ten-year truce, and peace negotiations during that truce.

For years, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal has been saying that his party will accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, which means de facto acceptance of the Jewish state of Israel, with the two states living peacefully side by side. Since none of those facts fit the prescribed script for US journalists, they were simply omitted.

Now, though, there's a glimmer of change on the horizon coming from the nation's two most influential news sources, The New York Times and The Washington Post. These are the trendsetters, the newspapers that other news editors across the country read regularly to find out the latest limits of what can count as news and what can be offered to the public as fact.

In early February, Times Jerusalem bureau chief Ethan Bronner reported on a meeting between Hamas and Fatah leaders to advance their plans for a unified Palestinian government. A few days later, the Post devoted an editorial to the same topic. The big news: neither the article nor the editorial offered as fact the once obligatory claim that Hamas is dedicated to the violent destruction of Israel.

On the contrary, Bronner suggested that while Hamas will maintain its "approach of resistance," it might well adopt compromising and nonviolent tactics: "Some analysts argue" that Hamas "would soon undergo some of the changes that Islamist movements elsewhere in the region are seen by some to be experiencing.... senior defense officials in Israel see a significant shift happening in Hamas.... Hamas is learning that governance is more important than terrorism." A Palestinian academic told Bronner that, "Western governments are dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and it is only a matter of time before they will meet with Hamas as well."

The Post editorial agreed, stating that "some Palestinian analysts speculate that Hamas is headed toward embracing the patronage - and the nonviolent Islamist political model - of the Brotherhood or Turkey's Justice and Development Party." It sent readers to an earlier article by the Post's Israel correspondent, Joel Greenberg, offering detailed evidence of a "moderating" and "pragmatic" trend in Hamas, including a retreat from violence.

Meshal has "raised the option of 'popular resistance,' a term for the unarmed protests that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has encouraged in the West Bank," Greenberg reported, quoting Meshal: "popular resistance is a program which is common to all the factions." Meshal did reserve the right to use violent resistance, but another Hamas official explained that "how we use it, and when we use it, is something different."

The Post's editorial speculated that there may be a debate within the Hamas leadership on the use of violence, and it made the outcome of that debate the crucial question. As long as armed resistance "is Hamas's doctrine, Palestinian unity will do more harm than good. Those who seek Middle East peace must hope that if the Abbas-Meshal accord goes forward, it will trigger an Arab Spring for Hamas." It's a real surprise to see the WaPo, which has generally been to the right of the Times on this issue, now offering hope for a "moderate Hamas" that the United States can deal with.

It's a bigger surprise to see the WaPo editors focusing solely on the violence issue. For years, the US government has insisted it will not have any dealings with Hamas until that party meets three conditions: renounce violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and agree to abide by all (always unspecified) prior agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. To overlook the latter two issues and focus only on renouncing violence - the direction Hamas is already taking - is a major shift on the part of perhaps the most influential editorial board in the country.

"Bad guys" can turn into "good guys" in the mass media amazingly quickly. That's what happened to the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority just a few years ago. If Hamas gets the same treatment, bringing the media image in line with the facts, it will open up political space for the Obama administration to pressure Israel to make compromises for peace.

Right now such pressure is too politically dangerous because the vast majority of Americans have swallowed the myth of Israel's insecurity: the outdated image of Israel "fighting for its life," surrounded by enemies sworn to destroy it. So any moves to support the Palestinian cause can easily be portrayed as weakness in the face of aggression, posing a major risk to Obama in an election year.

If Hamas were no longer seen as a violent threat, the whole myth would lose its credibility. Then the administration would have a lot more political freedom to push Israel to the peace table, where the best interests of the United States - and of the Palestinians and Israelis, too - could be served. Maybe, just maybe, that shift is already underway.

This article first appeared on Truthout, 18 February 2012
Ira Chernus is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Read more of his writings on Israel, Palestine, and the U.S. on his blog. To catch Timothy MacBain’s latest TomCast audio interview in which Chernus discusses what to make of American attitudes toward Israel and the Palestinians, click here, or download it to your iPod here.

Palestinians learning lessons

by Tareq Baconi

Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal (left) and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas

What has been happening to Hamas over the past few months, and what to Mahmoud Abbas? And what is the impact of all this on the reconciliation effort?

There has been much speculation over Hamas’ recent maneuverings and their impact on the latest reconciliation effort between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas’ leadership appears to be divided: Khaled Meshaal is making overtures that seem to be out of line with the movement’s perceived ideology. Or are they? What has been happening to Hamas over the past few months and what is the impact of that on the reconciliation effort?

Looking at the movement’s behaviour over the past decade or so, I would argue that Hamas’ desire to be integrated into the Palestinian political system has not subsided but has grown stronger. I would also argue that its actions do not suggest a recent softening in ideology or greater ‘moderation’. Rather, they are signs of an increased political adeptness which are enabling it to better communicate ‘more moderate’ goals that have been consistent for at least the past five years, arguably longer.

For the current reconciliation effort to succeed, it is important that the two parties do not proceed under the assumption that Hamas has only recently shown signs of moderation and is therefore likely to have different national objectives. No. Hamas has the same objectives for a unity government that it had back in 2006 when the last unity government was attempted. The difference now is that Mahmoud Abbas might be more open to these objectives and Hamas might be more competent at communicating them.

Essential lessons

The last significant reconciliation effort between Hamas and Fatah occurred following Yasser Arafat’s death in late 2004. By then, calls for Palestinian Authority (PA) reform were omnipresent and the Palestinian government was a mess, both physically and with respect to its authority and governance. Abbas reached out to the Palestinian factions proposing to shake up the political structure to make it more inclusive. He called on the factions to produce initiatives for a unified leadership and encouraged their participation in the government. He realized that to reform the Palestinian institutions and security forces for an effective fresh start in 2005, he needed the full support of the Palestinian people represented by the various factions.

Presidential elections took place 60 days following Arafat’s death followed by PLC elections in 2006 - the first in a decade. Those led to Hamas’ much publicized victory in a government of national unity which was democratically elected, more representative of the Palestinian people and bent on reform. For Palestinians, it was a promising start to democracy and reform in the territories apart for one fact; the international community led by the US opposed a Hamas-led government. Consequently, the newly-elected government failed as quickly as it formed and much more bloodily.

It did nonetheless leave behind essential lessons which are relevant to the current reconciliation efforts. At the time, there was an inherent incompatibility in the reform visions of the key players. Abbas’ ‘reform’ entailed reducing Fatah’s strong hold on the PA and the PLO institutions. He sought ‘buy in’ from other factions by steering the government towards greater inclusivity. He pursued greater coordination on the security and governance front and fostered more dialogue. Yet for all his reform efforts, Abbas was not ready, willing or able to concede that more inclusion could mean a shift in the Palestinian national strategy that Fatah had unilaterally forged over the years, a strategy based on negotiations.

Instead, he viewed increased inclusion as a means for the PA’s decisions to become more binding on ‘opposition factions’. Hamas’ presence in government, for example, would allow it to object to the PA’s participation in peace talks, but Hamas would most likely be outnumbered and would consequently have to acquiesce. After all, not every party in the government has to endorse every decision. Only the government has to endorse it for the parties to be bound by it.

In contrast, Hamas’ vision for reform was much more comprehensive. It envisioned a complete over-haul of the foundations and pillars of the Palestinian political establishment as it stood at the time. Whereas the PA was born out of Oslo, Hamas believed that the Second Intifada had clearly demonstrated the failure of negotiations, and therefore argued that the political system should not be based on such a default strategy. Rather, Hamas wished to establish a non-corrupt Palestinian government which represented the entirety of the Palestinian people, one which asserted its right to resistance and which was not bound by concessions which gave away basic ‘Palestinian constants’ such as the right of return. Such a government would set its national policy based on the democratic will of the Palestinian people, Hamas insisted, whether through negotiations or resistance.

This fundamental incompatibility meant that when both parties were indeed integrated into a single government, it was bound to fail. Clearly external pressure left no room for success, but internal challenges also existed. The government quickly disintegrated into a West Bank government and a Gaza government.

A narrowing gap

The historic incompatibility persists to this day, albeit to a lesser extent as the gap has narrowed since 2005. Both parties have acquired significant experience in their mutually exclusive governance which may shape the way they approach the current reconciliation effort.

Relative to 2005-2007, Abbas is a lot less susceptible to US and Israeli pressure, as is evident from his open defiance of both at the UN. Theoretically, his loss of faith in the peace process could make him more open to at least discussing alternatives to the Palestinian approach to the conflict, as compared to the past when his vision was limited by the urgent need to end the miserable cycle of violence.

Hamas has also changed over the past few years, but not in its vision of a unity Palestinian government open to resistance, despite the recent media fever over a sudden turn towards ‘moderation’. It has changed in its mode of engagement with the international community and other Palestinian factions.

Media preoccupation with Hamas’ ‘moderation’ focused on ‘the Doha agreement’ [1], where Hamas accepted Abbas’ appointment as Prime Minister of the interim Palestinian government. However, the fact that the government is an interim government is precisely what has escaped media attention. Hamas has not accepted a Palestinian leadership under Abbas. It has rather agreed that Abbas take the necessary pre-requisite steps leading to elections which would choose that leadership at the end of the year.

The interim government composed of a number of committees is tasked with the gargantuan challenge of creating a single governmental infrastructure and framework to house the soon-to-be elected government. It is also of course tasked with the challenge of reforming the election committee and preparing for the actual elections, suitably postponed now from the middle to the end of the year.

More proof that Hamas is moderating its stance is held up in the fact that it joined the PLO. Yet that is not a recent initiative either. Hamas has consistently stated that it wished to be a part of the PLO but had refused the PLO’s recognition of Israel. So what has changed? What has changed is that Hamas has joined the PLO, getting the process of reconciliation rolling again, but has not yet recognized Israel. World audiences may hope that by being part of the PLO Hamas has implicitly recognized Israel, but that is the same as saying that by accepting a Palestinian state with1967 borders, which it has, it has also implicitly recognized Israel. This latest move is therefore no more of a break with the core ideology than the offer of a long term hudna upon Israel’s withdrawal. No Hamas spokesperson will outwardly recognize Israel, which is a clear indication that Hamas has not actually made any ideological concessions by joining the PLO.

Joining in the ‘spring’?

Then comes the renunciation of violence. Seen alongside Meshaal’s declaration of intent in forming a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, it seems that the movement is splitting. Meshaal appears to be leading the movement through the regional upheaval by carving a place for it amongst the peaceful political Islamic parties coming to power in the region. His actions imply a return to a grass root organization focused on dawa and social work, one which could be active in politics and governance and which could forge ties with the international community. The Egyptian and Tunisian Islamic parties are clearly setting an example.

This vision is certainly more moderate than say Zahhar’s or Haniyeh’s in Gaza who appear to be wedded to Hamas’ commitment to resistance until the occupation has been forced to withdraw to 1967 borders. Yet the division between the two has not been formalized and it is unlikely to be. It is entirely feasible that Hamas’ historic pragmatism and flexibility are leading it down a path where it maintains ambiguity in its short term policies (Meshaal’s statements) while preserving its longer term ideology and dedication to the Palestinian constants (Zahhar’s statements). These are not signs of moderation but rather signs that the movement has become immensely more politicized. It is currently pursuing goals which it has had for a while, except doing so much more skillfully.

What all this means is that, despite media proclamations, Hamas has not moderated its stance significantly. It has voiced consistent objectives and expectations for the Palestinian government since at least its election in 2006 when it called for a democratic, representative Palestinian government which does not blindly engage in negotiations. Its recent strategic moves (joining the PLO, adopting non-violent resistance) therefore do not signal shifts in ideology so much as a newly adopted approach to implementing its objectives. This could mean greater moderation in the coming few months, but there should be no expectation that the movement has changed its 2006 national objectives. Hamas will call for a Palestinian political establishment which is not by default based on negotiations, but which will adopt the most appropriate strategy to serve the Palestinian nation, including resistance if that is needed.

It would save both sides of the reconciliation process a lot of time, not to mention lives, if they recognized this sooner rather than later, and dealt with any discrepancies before the elections. The parties should work on presenting the electorate with a shared vision of what the framework of a future Palestinian government could look like. Abbas should recognize that if elected again, Hamas will almost certainly reassess the role of negotiations based on their perceived benefit to the Palestinian population. This time, Abbas might be more willing to understand that negotiations have indeed failed and be open to discussing alternatives with Hamas, despite the inevitable US and Israeli pressure. It is only his readiness to do so and his understanding of Hamas’ goals which will determine the success of this reconciliation effort.

[1] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Behind the Headlines: Doha Agreement between Hamas and Fatah - A barrier to peace”

Tareq Baconi has an MPhil in international relations from the University of Cambridge and is currently completing his PhD specialising in Hamas at King's College, London
This article first appeared on Open Democracy, 21st February 2012.

The foreign policy of Ron Paul

by Felipe Dittrich Ferreira

Ron Paul taking questions in Manchester, NH, 8 January 2008

Photo: Bbsrock - Wikimedia Commons

Is the US a fixer or a troublemaker? Would a less interventionist US make the treatment of international conflicts easier or harder? Ron Paul has been accused of isolationism. But it is worth taking his foreign policy more seriously.

In 2008, Democrats were voted to the White House with a clear mandate: end wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; restore the commitment of American authorities to the rule of law – stained, internationally, by Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and internally by challenges to civil liberties contained in the Patriotic Act; as well as to reverse the severe economic downturn caused by the explosion of the real estate bubble.

In the third year of his term, President Obama has finally accepted to withdraw American troops from Iraq, leaving behind a time-bomb, fuelled by sectarian tensions and geopolitical disputes. US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the meanwhile, has increased, along with the risk of civil war in both countries. In Libya, a new model for regime-change intervention was tested, setting the stage for war against Syria and Iran, under the cover of dubious UN resolutions, through the use of ‘opposition leaders’ created out of thin air or taken way out of proportion[1]. Considered unworthy of greater efforts, Yemen and Somalia have witnessed the proliferation of drone attacks. Troops have been sent to Uganda. Bahrain, on the other hand, received a blank check to act against its own people, with military support from Saudi Arabia, in the interest of stability in the Persian Gulf. Guantanamo, in the backdrop, remains a legal black hole, either from the viewpoint of international law or against the framework of the US Constitution.

Internally, stimulus policies have proved far less effective than it was assumed. The debt ceiling discussion, in this context, is not trivial: there is a limit, indeed, to what governments can do to artificially pump up business cycles. As one rating agency correctly observed, this limit has more to do with politics than with economics, in a sense, however, not so clearly understood: the problem is not partisan or electoral politics; the real issue has to do with the ability of the US government to forcibly extract higher amounts of money from the American population to sustain long-term interventionist economic policies through over-taxation and increased inflation.

Among US republican presidential candidates, one could expect strong opposition to current lines of action, both in terms of foreign and domestic policy. Differences, however, have been expressed more in tone and emphasis, than in substance. Setting off a new war in the Middle East, for example, doesn’t seem to distress most of the candidates. Some seem to believe that the current administration is actually too soft with ‘non-compliant’ regimes in the region.

Representative Ron Paul, in this issue as well as in many others, stands out differently. In a recent interview on Fox News, when pressed on what the US could do to counter Iran, Paul offered an unusual set of answers: be less threatening; don’t put sanctions on them; maybe offer them friendship[2]. In another interview to the same channel, he gave more detail on his view: Iran, with that much oil, can’t make enough gasoline for itself; they don’t have intercontinental ballistic missiles; if they had a nuclear weapon, they wouldn’t dare to attack Israel; Israel – with three hundred nukes – could take care of them in minutes; the Iranians don’t have a tradition of sending troops and invading countries six thousand miles from their shores; the country has been respectful of its borders; are we going to turn the world upside down because someday they might have a nuclear weapon?[3]

Paul’s position regarding Iran is only part of a broader view – not about world peace, but rather about what the proper role of the US government is and what the real interests of the American people are. Paul believes that the presence of American troops around the world endangers rather than enhances US national security. Collateral damages and unintended consequences are some of the components of his critique of interventionism. The mujahidin of Afghanistan are a case in point, often mentioned by the candidate: trained and equipped by the US to fight Soviet occupation in the 1980s, they are now fighting American troops. A similar point could be made about the US participation in the deposition of Mohammad Mossadegh, the last democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The ousting of the secular and nationalist leader, in 1953, initially seemed to reinforce the US position in the Middle East. Statistically, it could be argued that interventions tend to create at least as many problems as they are able to solve.

In Paul’s argument, the internal dimensions of war also come to the fore. In wartime, he affirms, governments are always prone to promote security at the expense of freedom, in personal and economic terms. In one of his books, Paul recalls, in this sense, the imprisonment of American citizens of Japanese descent during the Second World War[4]. More recently, Paul heavily criticized the Obama administration for the assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, born in New Mexico, with ideological connections to Al Qaeda. He was deliberately killed by a drone attack in Yemen, without civil or military trial. No evidence of his participation in direct attacks against the US has been presented[5]. In a way, this case shows that whatever a government does against foreigners, it will eventually do against its own citizens.

Many have called Paul an isolationist, claiming that, as a major power, the US must remain deeply involved in world affairs. Considering the possibility that Paul might win the election, which is not entirely unlikely, given the fact that he appeals, potentially, both to Republicans and Democrats, this charge must be carefully assessed. Internationally, the question could be presented in the following terms: the US is a fixer or a troublemaker? A less interventionist America would make the treatment of international conflicts easier or harder?

I would like to defend Paul’s stance on this debate, by attempting to explain why non-interventionism might actually present good results, in many cases. If you are an elephant inside a pottery shop, getting out of the way might not be simple, but it is better than pretending you can pick and choose what you want without causing irreversible damage. In the Middle East, to consider the most china-shop-like situation, the US has been deeply involved, taking sides, choosing winners, arming, training and financing allies. Without US involvement, would any country in the region be strong enough to impose itself over others? Could any of them wage a non-defensive war against others without facing the risk of isolation and defeat? One could reasonably argue that without interference from game-changing heavyweights from outside the region, the Middle East would naturally tend towards accommodation and equilibrium, more or less as Europe did during the XIX century.

To comprehend the current dynamics, it would be worthy applying to the Middle East a model developed by Oxford economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler to understand civil wars. In 2000, taking a large database of conflicts into account, they proved that opportunities for predation play a large role in the formation of armed groups, without which civil wars can’t occur[6]. Such wars, consequently, are more likely in countries rich in easily exploitable natural resources, particularly when other options of income are scarce, especially for young males: “unlike a protest, a rebellion which generates a civil war is a sustained, full-time effort. Adherents must eat, and so, the rebel organization is constrained to be financially viable.” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000:12). In 2006, Collier complemented the model, putting stronger emphasis on feasibility[7]. This second study, built upon improved data, sustains the contention that where rebellion is materially feasible it will occur, regardless of motivation. Feasibility, to be precise, is such a strong factor, in Collier’s view, that it can acquire a life of its own, sustaining protracted conflicts no matter the outcomes: “indeed, since the typical civil war lasts for many years and rebel victories are rare, if rebellion is rational motivations are likely to reflect benefits during conflict, rather than prospective benefits consequent upon a victory which must be heavily discounted both by time and risk”. (Collier et al, 2006:06)

I would like to argue that the US works and is seen in the Middle East as a source of financing equivalent to oil and diamonds in other areas plagued by conflict. The prospect of receiving US support, either to fight or to disarm, makes governments and groups that would otherwise refrain from conflict choose not to conciliate. In some circumstances, US support seems to compensate the costs of war in such a large proportion that stability and peace are given virtually no value. The case of Afghanistan is perhaps the best possible example of this dynamic. Why would any country remain in war for so long without any meaningful, internal, easily exploitable source of income under dispute? When there is nothing to steal, countries tend to value peace and hard work more than war and adventure.

Ron Paul, therefore, does seem to have a point. The presence of the US in situations of conflict seems to create more trouble than it solves. Unintended consequences, blowback and collateral damages are part of the problem. I propose exploring these ideas in more detail, not only in political terms, but also economically. Collier’s model seems to present a good framework for such an effort. Under that light, the foreign policy of Ron Paul might well prove to be a consistent alternative to the foreign policy doctrine developed under Bush and Obama, which combines virulence and inefficacy in self-sustaining and ever-growing proportions.

Footnotes:
[1]Roberts, Hugh. Who said Gaddafi had to go? London Review of Books, v.33, n.22, 17 NOV 2011.
[2]Fox News, November 6th 2011
[3]Fox News, August 12th 2011
[4]Paul, Ron. The Revolution – A Manifesto. New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2008, p. 119.
[5]Cole, David. Killing Citizens in Secret. New York Review of Books Blog, 9 OCT 2011.
[6]Collier, Paul; Hoeffler, Anke. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2000.
[7]Collier, Paul et al. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Working Paper, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, 2006.

Felipe Dittrich Ferreira holds a master's degree in Forced Migration from St Antony's College, University of Oxford.
This article first appeared on openDemocracy February 14, 2012